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ARTICLE
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON
LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE:
RETHINKING THE ANALYSIS OF
ORIGINAL PURPOSE, SINGLE SUBJECT, AND
CLEAR TITLE CHALLENGES
MARTHA J. DRAGICH'
State constitutions generally contain numerous procedural limitations on
the state's legislative process, and courts occasionally invalidate laws that
are found to have been passed in violation of these requirements. Professor
Dragich argues that the courts have not provided well-reasoned analysis in
these cases and argues that the goals of the procedural limitations are, at
times, being frustrated by their lax enforcement. This Article focuses on three
forms of procedural challenges in an attempt to explain where the courts
have erred and to provide a more coherent method of analyzing these claims
in the future.
State constitutions contain a variety of provisions governing legisla-
tive procedures.' Unlike substantive limits, procedural restrictions regu-
late only the process by which legislation is enacted. 2 Common examples
are original purpose, single subject, and clear title restrictions.' Original
purpose clauses prohibit the amendment of a bill so "as to change its
original purpose."4 Single subject rules limit each bill to one subject.5
Clear title rules require that the subject of the bill be clearly expressed in
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Law Library, University of Missouri-
Columbia. J.D., University of Minnesota, 1983; M.A., University of Minnesota. 1983;
B.A., University of Minnesota, 1978. I wish to thank Dean Timothy J. Heinsz for his sup-
port of this project; Professor Michelle Cecil for helpful comments; librarian Cindy Shear-
rer and law students J. Matthew Miller and Heather Richenberger for research assistance;
Kathy Smith for preparation of the manuscript; and Lowell Pearson for everything. All
errors are mine.
I See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure:
Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. Pmr. L. REv. 797, 798 (1987).2See People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 266 (Ill. 1999); Michael WV. Catalano, The
Single Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian Logrolling, 3 EMErtGING IsSUES IN
STATE CONST. LAw 77,77; see also Williams, supra note I, at 799 (contrasting substantive
and procedural limitations).
3 See Williams, supra note 1, at 798-99. Other procedural limitations exist, but less
frequently serve as the basis for challenging legislation. See, e.g., MO. CONSr. art. Il. § 20
(requiring a quorum and public sessions); id. § 25 (establishing time limits for introduction
of bills); id. § 28 (requiring bills reviving, reenacting, or amending prior laws to be set
forth in full).4E.g., Mo. CONST. art. Im, § 21.
S See, e.g., id. § 23.
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the bill's title.6 These provisions are designed to eradicate perceived
abuses in the legislative process, such as hasty, corrupt, or private interest
legislation.7 They are intended to promote open, orderly, and deliberative
legislative processes,8 and can be found in almost all state constitutions.9
The genesis of state constitutional restrictions on legislative proce-
dure has been recounted elsewhere. 0 The clear title rule, for example,
was first adopted in 1798 in Georgia" and the single subject rule first
appeared in 1818 in Illinois.' 2 Most other states followed suit in the mid-
nineteenth century. 13 Constitutional restrictions on legislative procedure
have survived 14 and have been re-adopted in modern constitutions despite
criticism that they allow the invalidation of legislation on "technical"
grounds. '5
State constitutional restrictions on legislative procedure, unlike leg-
islative rules adopted by the two houses of Congress, 6 provide an avenue
6 See, e.g., id.
7 See Williams, supra note 1, at 798. The adoption of the clear title rule, for example,
can be traced to the infamous Yazoo land scandal perpetrated by the Georgia legislature in
1795. See Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 389, 391-92 (1958); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Inter-
pretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 554 (1988); see also Cady v. Jardine, 193 S.E. 869, 870
(Ga. 1937) (holding that the title of an act, "to create the office of commissioner of roads
and revenues," was broad enough to cover a provision in the law to designate the commis-
sioner).
8 Williams, supra note 1, at 798; Popkin, supra note 7, at 553-54.
9See Williams, supra note 1, at 798; Popkin, supra note 7, at 554; IA NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17.01, at 1 (5th ed. 1992) (single
subject); id. § 18.01, at 25 (clear title). Appendix I to this Article is a chart showing which
state constitutions currently include original purpose, single subject, and clear title provi-
sions. In contrast, the federal constitution imposes few procedural requirements; most
congressional procedures are set by standing rules of the House and Senate. ABNER J.
MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 110-11 (1995); Williams, supra note 1, at
798.
10 See, e.g., Popkin, supra note 7, at 533-54; Ruud, supra note 7, at 389-90 (history of
single subject rule); id. at 391-92 (history of clear title rule); Catalano, supra note 2, at
78-80 (history of single subject rule).
"1 See Ruud, supra note 7, at 391-92; see also Cady v. Jardine, 193 S.E. 869, 870 (Ga.
1937).
12 See Ruud, supra note 7, at 389.
11 See id. at 453-55 (chart showing, for each state, the date of adoption of a single
subject restriction); Williams, supra note 1, at 798 (noting that procedural limitations were
adopted "throughout the nineteenth century").
14 In a rare exception, when Illinois adopted a new constitution in 1970, it dropped the
clear title rule but retained the single subject rule. See Aaron Chambers, State's Single
Subject Rule Subject to Numerous Interpretations, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 22, 2000, at
1.
15 Williams, supra note 1, at 799-800 (describing such criticism); see also Republicans
in Illinois Feud Over Gun Control, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 29, 1999, at A16 [hereinafter Repub-
licans Feud] (describing as a "technicality" the Illinois Supreme Court's invalidation of a
gun control measure for violation of the single subject rule).
16 Because Congress enforces its own rules and because there are few procedural limi-
tations in the federal Constitution, there are few procedural challenges that can be made to
a federal statute. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 9, at 118; RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN
E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 10.9, at
[Vol. 38
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for challenging statutes, and such litigation is fairly common.' 7 The large
number of procedural challenge cases seems surprising since State courts
consistently proclaim that statutes are presumed constitutional. 8 The
Missouri Supreme Court, for example, has long insisted that
[t]he use of these procedural limitations to attack the constitu-
tionality of statutes is not favored. A statute has a presumption
of constitutionality. We interpret procedural limitations liberally
and will uphold the constitutionality of a statute against such an
attack unless the act clearly and undoubtedly violates the con-
stitutional limitation. The burden of establishing [a statute's]
unconstitutionality rests upon the party questioning it.' 9
Other states likewise favor a liberal construction :O of procedural restric-
tions.2" Courts have used a variety of phrases to express the high standard
122 (3d ed. 1999) (procedural rules of both houses of Congress are "beyond judicial chal-
lenge").
17 See Catalano, supra note 2, at 80 (stating that single subject challenges "continue on
a rather regular basis"). A Wesflaw search run by the author in the Allstates database on
August 9, 2000 returned 87 state highest court cases involving single subject, clear title, or
original purpose challenges from 1990 to date. These cases came from 28 states, though
they tended to be concentrated in a handful of states. Missouri had 10 cases, Washington
and Illinois each had 8, Alabama and Vest Virginia each had 6, Iowa and Wyoming each
had 5, Ohio had 4, and Maryland had 3 during this period. Appendix II to this Article lists
the cases by state. Single subject cases involving appropriations bills and cases involving
laws enacted by the initiative process have been excluded. Both types of cases present
special considerations outside the scope of this Article. See Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder,
718 N.E.2d 191, 197-98 (Ill. 1999) (noting that appropriations bills are exempt from single
subject requirements under ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d)); State ex rel. Caleb v. Beesley, 949
P.2d 724, 727-28 (Ore. 1997) (comparing separate constitutional provisions requiring that
measures enacted by initiative and laws enacted by the legislature embrace single sub-jects).
8See, e.g., People v. Wooters, 722 N.E.2d 1102, 1106 (Il1. 1999); State ex rel. Ohio
Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1099 (Ohio 1999); Pierce v. State,
910 P2d 288, 306 (N.M. 1995).
19 C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Mo. 2000) (en bane) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citations omitted) (brackets in original). Similar language appears
throughout the Missouri cases. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495, 497 (Mo. 1870)
(noting that such provisions are given a "very liberal interpretation"); State ex rel. Nieder-
meyer v. Hackmann, 237 S.W. 742, 743 (Mo. 1922) (en banc) (commenting that it is "uni-
formly held" that such provisions are to be "liberally construed"); State er rel. Normandy
Sch. Dist. v. Small, 356 S.W.2d 864, 877 (Mo. 1962) (en bane) (Storckman, J., dissenting)
(stating that if constitutionality is in doubt, "such doubt must be resolved in favor of [the
statute's] validity"); Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Co. v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Mo. 1984)
(en bane) (stating that the court is "allowed to make every reasonable intendment to sustain
the constitutionality of the statute"); Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.\1.2d 98,
102 (Mo. 1994) (en bane) (noting that the court interprets procedural limitations liberally).
20 In this Article, the phrase "liberal construction" is used-consistent with the lan-
guage used by the Missouri Supreme Court-to mean that procedural challenges are disfa-
vored.
21 See, e.g., People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ill. 1999); Associated Builders
& Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2000); Ohio Acad. of Trial Law-
yers, 715 N.E.2d at 1099; State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 955
20011
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to be applied in these cases, stating that statutes will be held unconstitu-
tional, for example, only if "clearly, plainly and palpably so, ' ' only if
shown "beyond a reasonable doubt" to violate the constitution,23 or only
in case of a "manifestly gross and fraudulent violation." As a result of
these high standards, state courts uphold legislation against procedural
challenges "more often than not." The Minnesota Supreme Court ob-
served that from the late 1970s until 2000, it had decided five single
subject/clear title cases, upholding the statute in every case.26 In 1984, a
Missouri judge indicated that the Missouri Supreme Court had not sus-
tained a procedural challenge in twenty years. 27
Why, then, do litigants continue to raise original purpose, single
subject, and clear title claims? One explanation of this behavior is that
"[s]uch challenges are easy to make because all that is necessary is refer-
ence to the face of the statute. '28 Another explanation is that each of these
cases, depending as it does on the specific text of a particular enactment,
is sui generis.2 9 As such, there is always a chance that a court will sustain
a challenge to one piece of legislation even though it has rejected chal-
lenges to many other statutes. A more cynical explanation is that proce-
dural challenges offer litigants one last chance to attack legislation they
were unable to defeat during the legislative process? 0 Overall, these ex-
planations suggest that procedural challenges remain common because
although they are low-return, they are also low-risk.
P2d 1136, 1145-46 (Kan. 1998); Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 570 N.W.2d 451,
458 (Iowa 1997); Md. Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 694 A.2d 937, 943 (Md. 1997);
In re Boot, 925 P.2d 964, 971 (Wash. 1996); Keyserling v. Beasley, 470 S.E.2d 100, 102
(S.C. 1996); McIntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 853 (Or. 1996); Accounts Mgmt., Inc. v.
Williams, 484 N.W.2d 297, 299 (S.D. 1992); Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 430 (Wyo.
1990).
22 Utilicorp United, 570 N.W.2d at 454.
23 Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506, 507 (Ohio 1997); Westvaco Corp. v. S.C. Dept.
of Revenue, 467 S.E.2d 739, 741 (S.C. 1995).
24 State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582, 586 (Ohio 1994).
25 Catalano, supra note 2, at 80 (referring to single subject challenges).
2 Associated Builders & Contractors, 610 N.W.2d at 300.
2 Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Co. v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2, 7 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (Wel-
liver, J., dissenting). Between 1984 and 1994, that trend continued unabated. A Westlaw
search conducted by the author returned no case decided after Westin Crown Plaza Hotel
that invalidated a statute under article III, sections 21 or 23 of the Missouri Constitution
until Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
2 Catalano, supra note 2, at 82.
29See Kincaid v. Mangum, 432 S.E.2d 74, 81 (W. Va. 1993) (citing IA NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17.03, at 9 (4th ed. 1985)) (indicat-
ing that there is no accurate mechanical rule); Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d
1111, 1121 (Md. 1990) (stating that a court ordinarily must decide on a case-by-case ba-
sis); see also M. Albert Figinski, Maryland's Constitutional One-Subject Rule: Neither a
Dead Letter Nor an Undue Restriction, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 363, 370 n.48 (1998) (noting
that each case must be decided on its own facts).
3 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 1, at 824; Harold Stearley, Case Note, Missouri's
Single-Subject Rule: A Legal Tool to Attack Environmental Legislation?, 7 Mo. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y REV. 41, 48 (1999).
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Whatever their motivations, these claims have begun to pay off. The
Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, "sound[ed] an alarm that (it]
would not hesitate to strike down" legislation violating single subject and
clear title provisions.3' The Missouri Supreme Court has heard ten proce-
dural challenge cases since 1994,32 finding violations in five of them."
The Illinois Supreme Court sustained only one single subject challenge
from 1970 to 1996, but it has sustained four challenges since 1997. 3
A recent Illinois decision led to a nationally publicized furor in the
Illinois legislature.36 In People v. Cervantes," the Illinois Supreme Court
struck down the Safe Neighborhoods Law for violation of the single
subject restriction.38 The law had been in effect nearly five years at the
time of the decision.39 The scope of the Illinois court's ruling-striking
down the entire enactment-is important. The court found that the Safe
Neighborhoods Law was intended to address neighborhood safety prob-
lems relating to "gangs, drugs, and guns."'4' Two portions of the law were
found to constitute separate subjects: provisions amending the WIC
(Women, Infants, and Children nutrition program) Vendor Management
Act, and provisions relating to the licensing of secure residential youth
care facilities.42 The Illinois Supreme Court discerned "no natural and
logical connection" between these provisions and neighborhood safety. 3
The portion of the Safe Neighborhoods Law challenged in Cervantes re-
lated not to the WIC vendor management program or the licensing of
residential youth care facilities, but to weapons." Because the entire act
3 1 Associated Builders & Contractors, 610 N.W.2d at 301.
3 Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 98; Akin v. Dir. of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295 (Mo.
1996) (en banc); Carmack v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Agric., 945 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. 1997) (en
banc); Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); Mo. Health Care
Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 953 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); Stroh Brewery Co. v. State,
954 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir., Dept. of
Natural Res., 964 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1998) (en banc); St. Louis Health Care Network v.
State, 968 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998) (en banc); Corvera Abatement Tech., Inc. v. Air Con-
servation Comm'n, 973 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1998) (en banc); C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of
Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
33 See Appendix II.
34 Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago, 311 N.E.2d 116 (111. 1974).
3 People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265 (il. 1999); People v. Wooters, 722 N.E.2d
1102 (11. 1999); People v. Reedy, 708 N.E.2d 1114 (Ill. 1999); Johnson v. Edgar, 680
N.E.2d 1372 (111. 1997).
See Illinois Legislators Try to Come to a Compromise on the Safe Neighborhoods
Act (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 15, 1999) (transcript available on LEXIS)
[hereinafter Legislators Compromise]; Republicans Feud, supra note 15.
723 N.E.2d 265 (111. 1999).
3Id. at 266.
39Id.
40 It appears that severability was argued only on the motion for rehearing, which the
court denied. Id. at 274 (McMorrow, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing).
41 Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d at 270.
42 Id. at 270-71.43 Id. at 270.
4Id. at 266 (describing indictment on gunrunning charge).
2001]
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was ruled unconstitutional, however, the defendant's gunrunning charge
was dismissed. In fact, prosecutors were "forced to dismiss" firearms
charges against numerous defendants.45 Five years after initial passage of
the Safe Neighborhoods Law, the Illinois legislature found itself sharply
divided on the merits of reenacting the gun control provisions.4 6 The
measure has not been reenacted even though the Governor called a spe-
cial session of the legislature for that purpose.47
The Safe Neighborhoods Law exemplifies one consistent thread
among recent procedural challenge cases: major changes were introduced
into the challenged bills very late in the legislative process. This type of
legislative procedure runs directly counter to the open, rational, and de-
liberative model the constitutional restrictions contemplate. 4s Bills en-
acted in a hasty, apparently deceptive, or ill-considered process thus
seem to invite procedural challenges. To return to Cervantes, the original
Senate bill, relating to community service sentencing, was amended in
the House so as to replace its entire contents with new provisions, now
described as the "Safe Neighborhoods Law.' 49 The Senate refused to con-
cur with the House amendment. 0 A conference committee was formed,
and that body deleted the entire House amendment and substituted an-
other entirely new bill, 157 pages long and containing three compo-
nents.5' That version then passed the Senate and the House and was
signed by the governor.52 Similarly, in a Missouri case, St. Louis Health
Care Network v. State,53 a substitute bill was offered on the last day of the
legislative session for a bill originally relating to the Missouri Family
Trust.54 The substitute bill contained provisions relating to nonprofit cor-
porations, charitable gift annuities, and same-sex marriages.55 In both
cases, the timing and scope of the changes raised suspicion.
A court's description of the legislative procedure leading to passage
of the bill at issue sometimes indicates that the court's willingness to
overturn the law is based on a suspicion that the process was tainted. For
45 Republicans Feud, supra note 15; see also Bob Chiarito, Experts Predict Raft of Ap-
peals in Wake of 'Safe Neighborhoods' Ruling, CHi. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 20, 2000, at I
(stating that over 2,600 weapons convictions would be affected by the Cervantes ruling).
46 Republicans Feud, supra note 15; Legislators Compromise, supra note 36.
47 See Aaron Chambers, Court Rejects Rehearing of 'Safe Neighborhoods Law' Ruling,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 31, 2000, at 1 (stating that the law has not been reenacted be-
cause legislators cannot agree on gun provisions).
48 See Williams, supra note 1, at 798; Popkin, supra note 7, at 553-54.
49 Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d at 268.
5 Id.51 Id.
52 Id.
51968 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
l4Id. at 146. The Missouri Family Trust is intended to "encourage[ J, enhance[ 1, and
foster[] ... the provision of medical, social, or other supplemental services for persons
with a mental or physical impairment." Mo. Rev. STAT. § 402.199 (2000).
55 St. Louis Health Care Network, 968 S.W.2d at 146. The law was invalidated for
violation of the clear title requirement. Infra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 38
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example, the Maryland Court of Appeals described the "trans-
mogrifi[cation]" of a one-page bill concerning a specific tax into "lengthy
emergency legislation" extending to government ethics and county taxing
authority.56 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
explained how a bill on thoroughbred racing became "an omnibus bill
which encompassed authorization for all agency rules considered that
year."' In National Solid Waste Management. Ass'n r. Director, Depart-
ment of Natural Resources,5 8 the Missouri Supreme Court described a
more subtle, but no less important, last-minute change:
Two days before the end of the 1995 legislative session, the
House of Representatives tacked onto the tail-end of the 31-
page Senate Bill 60... an amendment ... that.., expanded the
subject of the bill from one that originally encompassed only
"solid waste management" to one encompassing both "solid
waste management" and "hazardous waste management:"59
The court described these practices as exactly those the constitutional
procedural limitations are designed to prevent.'
Recognizing that state courts are beginning to review procedural
challenges more rigorously, this Article attempts to provide guidance for
the resolution of such cases. Part I examines the history, purposes, and
standards of original purpose, single subject, and clear title restrictions,
using Missouri's provisions as examples. Part I also identifies paradig-
matic cases of each of the procedural violations with the hope of more
sharply differentiating the three claims.
Parts II through V present a case study of ten Missouri cases decided
since 1994, supplemented with notable cases from other states. Part II
begins with a brief description of the Missouri cases. These cases to-
gether address all three of the constitutional restrictions, and do so in
more depth and variety than do the recent cases of any other single state.
As such, they constitute a compact yet well-developed body of law for
analysis. Part II concludes by presenting a preliminary assessment of the
Missouri Supreme Court's analysis of these claims.
Part III uses the Missouri cases as a basis from which to develop a
framework for analysis of original purpose, single subject, and clear title
claims. The proposed analytical framework is tested against cases re-
56Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111. 1114 (Md. 1990).
57Kincaid v. Mangum, 432 S.E.2d 74, 77 (W. Va. 1993). The court also noted that the
bill did not set out the rules in full, but rather referred legislators to the state rcgister for
the contents of the rules. Id. at 78.
S 964 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1998).
59Id. at 819; see also Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d 1225, 1232 (Md. 2000) (holding that
an act that protected individuals from being appointed as resident agents and which pro-
tected certain companies from derivative suits violated the single subject restriction).60Solid faizste Mgnt., 964 S.W.2d at 820.
2001]
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cently decided in Missouri and other states. In most cases, the proposed
analysis would mandate the result actually reached. The proposed analy-
sis, however, may provide greater clarity to guide the decision of future
cases. In a few cases, it would mandate a different result.
Part IV briefly discusses the particular bill versions relevant to the
analysis of each claim. It argues that certain violations cannot be proven
if the court looks only at the version of the bill finally passed.
Finally, Part V discusses potential remedies, concluding that sever-
ance of the offending provisions is the proper remedy under some, but
not all, circumstances. As the Cervantes case illustrates, consideration of
the remedy is necessary to strike an appropriate balance between com-
peting interests: enforcement of the constitutional restrictions, on one
hand, and deference to the legislature's policy choices, on the other.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
This Part defines the requirements of original purpose, single sub-
ject, and clear title rules and discusses the historical bases of, and pur-
poses served by, each. The three procedural requirements are related in
that they are parts of a comprehensive constitutional design to control the
legislative process.6' Moreover, the three provisions all were adopted at
around the same time,62 and all reflect suspicion of, and disillusionment
with, the legislative process. 63 But the requirements themselves, and the
61 See Williams, supra note 1, at 798 (describing the inclusion, in "virtually all state
constitutions:' of a "wide range of limitations on state legislative processes"); Popkin,
supra note 7, at 553-55 (describing the adoption of procedural and substantive require-
ments to discourage private interest legislation).
62 See Williams, supra note 1, at 798. Williams confirms that the types of procedural
limitations discussed here were not found in the earliest state constitutions. Id. at 798. In
Missouri, article III, section 21 (original purpose) dates back to the Constitution of 1875
(as article IV, sections 24, 25, and 26), while article III, section 23 (single subject and clear
title) dates back to the Constitution of 1865 (as article IV, section XXXII). Similarly, many
states adopted these procedural limitations in the last half of the nineteenth century. See,
e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (single subject and clear title limitations were adopted in
1875); id. § 19 (original purpose limitation was adopted in 1875); COLO. CONST. art. V,
§ 21 (single subject and clear title limitations were adopted in 1876); id. § 17 (original
purpose limitation was adopted in 1876); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (all three provisions
were originally codified in 1850 as MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. VI, §§ 20, 25); MONT.
CONsT. art. V, § 11(3) (single subject and clear title provisions were adopted in 1889); id.
§ 11(l) (original purpose provision was adopted in 1889); PA. CONST. art. III, § 3 (single
subject and clear title limitations were adopted in 1874); id. § 1 (original purpose rule was
adopted in 1874); Wyo. CONsT. art. 3, § 24 (single subject and clear title rules were
adopted in 1889); id. § 20 (original purpose rule was adopted in 1889). By contrast, Texas
adopted single subject and clear title provisions in 1845, TEx. CONST. art. III, §§ 35(a),
35(b), and added the original purpose rule in 1876, id. § 30.
63 See State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495 (1870) (observing that provisions were "designed to
strike down a most vicious and corrupt system which prevailed in our legislative bodies");
Jack L. Landau, The Intended Meaning of "Legislative Intent" and Its Implications for
Statutory Construction in Oregon, 76 OR. L. REv. 47, 86 (1997) (describing state constitu-
tional amendments in the nineteenth century); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsToRY OF
[Vol. 38
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purposes they serve, are distinct.6 As such, each rule calls for its own
test for compliance, depends on the consideration of a particular version
of the bill, and raises distinct concerns with respect to remedies. As a
first step, this Article attempts to outline the rationales for each require-
ment, using paradigmatic cases of each violation in order to provide
context for the analytical discussion that follows in Part IP
A. Original Purpose
Missouri's original purpose provision is typical. It reads in pertinent
part:
No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so
amended in its passage through either house as to change its
original purpose. Bills may originate in either house and be
amended or rejected by the other. Every bill shall be read by ti-
tle on three different days in each house.'
By its text, section 21 not only establishes the original purpose rule, but
also implies a limitation of the rule and hints at the rule's underlying ra-
tionale. The text makes clear that the original purpose rule does not pro-
hibit amendments to a bill during the course of its consideration and pas-
sage. In fact, it explicitly permits either house to amend bills originating
in the other house.6 The Missouri Supreme Court has indicated that "Ar-
ticle III, § 21 was not designed to inhibit the normal legislative proc-
esses, in which bills are combined and additions necessary to comply
with the legislative intent are made"' 68 At least one other state agrees that
the original purpose rule should not be applied in such a way as to "un-
duly hamper the legislature "'69
In essence, the original purpose rule is "designed to prevent the en-
actment of... statutes in terms so blind that legislators themselves ...
[would fail] to become apprised of the changes in the laws" '70 The final
AMERICAN LAW 122 (1985) (describing scandals leading to the perception that legislatures
were captive to special interests); J. WILLARD Huits, THE GROWTH OF AmERICAN LAv
37-38 (1950) (describing early 19th-century hostility to the legislative process).
6 See Viliams, supra note 1, at 799 (noting that there are important differences
among constitutional limitations on legislative procedures).
6 The single subject and clear title rules are considered together because they are gen-
eraly contained in the same constitutional provision. See infra note 82.
6 Mo. CONST. art. III, § 21 (emphasis added).
6 Id. I assume that the power of either house to amend bills from the other house nec-
essarily includes the lesser power of either house to amend its own bills.
63 Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.V.2d 323, 326 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (quoting
Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc. of Mo. v. Frappier, 681 S.V.2d 925, 929 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc)).
0 Barclay v. Melton, 5 S.W.3d 457,459 (Ark. 1999).
7 0 Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W. 2d 31, 38 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (quoting State
v. Ludwig, 322 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Mo. 1959) (en banc)); see also Billis v. State, 800 P.2d
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sentence of section 21 supports this rationale. It provides for the reading
by title of each bill on three different days in each house.71 The rule pro-
tects the legislative process by allowing bills to be read and monitored by
title alone. That is, a legislator is entitled to read bills as originally intro-
duced and to decide, on that basis, how extensively to monitor each bill's
progress. Legislators are assured that the purpose of a bill will not have
changed dramatically following its introduction. This same reasoning
serves to provide adequate notice to members of the public who wish to
monitor pending legislation.
The original purpose rule also reinforces the deadline for introduc-
tion of new bills by preventing legislators from disguising new bills as
amendments to existing bills.72 Accordingly, the original purpose rule is
concerned with changes in content of the bill. By aiding legislators in
monitoring hundreds of bills introduced in each legislative session, the
original purpose rule helps legislators to represent the desires of their
constituents.
Though only a few of the recent cases involve original purpose
claims, the outcomes are instructive. 73 In Barclay v. Melton,74 a bill that
"had as its sole purpose the creation of a tax credit for dependents" was
amended by deleting all of the provisions contained in the introduced
version and replacing them with new contents.75 As passed, the bill "as-
sess[ed] a tax surcharge against ... residents of [certain] school dis-
tricts. '76 The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the change from a
tax credit to a tax surcharge was a change in the bill's original purpose."
401,428 (Wyo. 1990) (stating that the goal of the original purpose rule is "to preclude last-
minute, hasty legislation and to provide notice to the public of legislation under considera-
tion") (quoting Anderson v. Oakland County Clerk, 353 N.W.2d 448, 455 (Mich. 1984)).
71 Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 21.
72See 1 SINGER, supra note 9, § 9.05, at 580. In Missouri, article III, section 25 pro-
vides that new bills cannot be introduced after the 60th day of the session. See infra note
272 and accompanying text. Illinois lawmakers reportedly have adopted a new strategy
following the Cervantes decision: the introduction of some 800 "shell bills." The "shell
bills" are left blank until later amended in "any way [lawmakers] see fit." Numerous Inter-
pretations, supra note 14, at 1. This strategy may succeed because the Illinois Constitution
lacks an original purpose clause. See Appendix I.
73 See Appendix II. In only two cases did the court find a violation.
74 5 S.W.3d 457 (Ark. 1999).
73 Id. at 459.
76 1d. at 460.
77 Id. The only original purpose challenge ever sustained by the Missouri Supreme
Court involved a similar change. In Allied Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bell, 185 S.W.2d 4, 6
(Mo. 1945), a bill originally introduced to eliminate the deduction of premiums paid for
reinsurance was changed so as to establish a tax on premium receipts. In both cases, the
change in the bill had the effect of enacting the opposite result-essentially changing from
a tax decrease to a tax increase.
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Changes less extreme than this about-face seem not to trigger invali-
dation on original purpose grounds. 78 Advisory Opinion No. 3317 appears
to be unusual in this regard. There, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled
that a bill whose original purpose was "to make appropriations for the
ordinary expenses of... the government" was unconstitutionally altered
so as to change its original purpose when provisions limiting the powers
of government officials to make necessary expenditures were added.'
According to the court, the purpose of the bill changed "from one of
making general appropriations ... to one of... repealing and changing
other provisions of law ... *"81 This bill represents a more subtle change.
As finally passed, it contained two contradictory elements: provisions
authorizing expenditures and provisions limiting the same expenditures.
This case adds credence to the notion that a change in direction is fun-
damental in establishing an original purpose violation.
B. Single Subject and Clear Title
In most states, the single subject and clear title rules are combined in
one section of the constitution." The combined rule is commonly
phrased: "[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be
clearly expressed in its title:'as In some states, a bill must embrace "one
subject, and matters properly connected therewith." Exceptions are
commonly made for certain types of bills,s such as "general appropria-
78 For example, although the Missouri Supreme Court found no violation, this Article
considers C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. 2000) (en bane), a good
example of an original purpose violation. The bill, as introduced, concerned the definition
of a particular position on a transportation commission. Id. at 325. As finally passed. the
bill included additional provisions relating to employment in transportation agencies, as
well as provisions authorizing cities and counties to regulate billboards. Id. Given the dra-
matic change in scope of the bill, it is difficult to accept the conclusion that the purpose of
this bill did not change. Even if we accept (as the court did) that the bill's subject is
"transportation" and that billboards are "fairly relate[d]" to that subject, id. at 328. the
facts of the case still suggest that an original purpose violation occurred. The introduction
of the billboard provisions came when the bill "was being taken up for the third reading,"
long after the constitutional deadline for introduction of new measures had passed. Id. at
325. Legislators who read the original bill, and thereafter monitored it by title, would have
had no reason to suspect the enormous change in the scope and objectives of the bill. Thus,
this Article argues that the amendment pertaining to billboards runs afoul of the original
purpose rule. See infra notes 223-229 and accompanying text.
79 582 So. 2d 1115 (Ala. 1991).
8 Id. at 1117-18 (relying on the bill's title for a description of its original purpose).
SI Id. at 1118.
82 IA SINGER, supra note 9, § 17.01, at 1-2; see also, e.g., MD. CoNsr. art. 11, § 29
("[E]very law ... shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title."):
N.Y. CONsr. art. 3, § 15 ("No private or local bill ... shall embrace more than one subject,
and that shall be expressed in the title:').
83 Mo. CONST. art. II, § 23 (emphasis added). The text of this section is unchanged
from the 1875 Constitution, where it appeared as article IV, section 28.
8 IowA CON sT. art. m, § 29.
1 IA SINGER, supra note 9, § 17.01, at 1 (describing exceptions in 15 states for reve-
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tion bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts for
which moneys are appropriated,"'86 and bills revising or codifying the
law.87 It is well-established that even when combined, the single sub-
ject/clear title provision sets forth two independent requirements-that a
bill have only one subject, and that the bill's title clearly express that
subject." The common phrasing of the rule suggests that clear title analy-
sis cannot proceed until the subject of the bill has been determined and
found to be "single." 89
1. Single Subject
Two reasons are thought to support the single subject requirement:
the prevention of logrolling9' and the preservation of a meaningful role
for the governor.91 Simply stated, the single subject rule exists "to secure
to every distinct measure of legislation a separate consideration and deci-
sion, dependent solely upon its individual merits."92 One leading com-
nue bills, appropriations bills, and codification acts).
86 MO. CONsT. art. III, § 23.
87 See, e.g., ALASKA CONsT. art. II, § 13 ("Every bill shall be confined to one subject
unless it is ... one codifying, revising, or rearranging existing laws."); ILL. CONST. art. 4,
§ 8(d) ("Bills, except bills.., for the codification, revision, or rearrangement of laws, shall
be confined to one subject."); IND. CONsT. art. 4, § 19 ("An act, except an act for the
codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject...."); LA.
CONST. art. 3, § 15(A) ("Every bill, excepting.., bills for the rearrangement, codification,
or revision of a system of laws, shall be confined to one subject."); see also Ex parte
Coker, 575 So. 2d 43, 48-49 (Ala. 1991) (opinion of Almon, J., on application for rehear-
ing) (discussing the codification exception to the single subject rule).
8See Corvera Abatement Tech., Inc. v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 973 S.W.2d 851,
861 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) ("two distinct limitations"); Patrice v. Murphy, 966 P.2d 1271,
1274 (Wash. 1998) ("two separate prohibitions"); Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Iowa Util. Bd.,
570 N.W.2d 451, 455 (independent but closely related requirements); Md. Classified Em-
ployees Ass'n v. State, 694 A.2d 937, 942 (two distinct but related requirements); MeIntire
v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 853 (Or. 1996) (separate but related requirements); see also Ruud,
supra note 7, at 391 (stating that single subject and clear title provisions, though linked in
a single amendment, "have independent operation; independent historical bases; and sepa-
rate purposes"); 1A SINGER, supra note 9, § 17.01, at 2 (stating that the two "independent
provisions serv[e] distinct constitutional purposes").
89 Cf. Mclntire, 909 P.2d at 853 (stating that the rule "sets distinct requirements for the
body of an act, the title of the act, and the relationship between the body and the title").
9 Logrolling is the "practice of procuring diverse and unrelated matters to be passed
as one 'omnibus' through the consolidated votes of the advocates of each separate measure,
when perhaps no single measure could have been passed on its own merits." IA SINGER,
supra note 9, § 17.01, at 2. Single subject cases are replete with references to logrolling
and omnibus bills. See, e.g., People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Il1. 1999); Associ-
ated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2000); Ohio Acad. of
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1098 (Ohio 1999); Brower v. State, 969 P.2d
42, 69 (Wash. 1998); Patrice, 966 P.2d at 1274 (Wash. 1998); State ex rel. Tomasic v.
Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 955 P.2d 1136, 1165 (Kan. 1998); Md. Classified
Employees Ass'n, 694 A.2d at 943; Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506, 507 (Ohio 1997);
Bayh v. Ind. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 674 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind. 1996);
Mclntire, 909 P.2d at 854; Kincaid v. Mangum, 432 S.E.2d 74, 76 (W. Va. 1993).
91 See Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
9 Ruud, supra note 7, at 390 (quoting Minnesota v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312, 322
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mentator observed, "limiting each bill to a single subject" allows legis-
lators to "better grasp[ ] and more intelligently discuss[ ]" the issues pre-
sented by each bill.93 Without the rule, the danger is that "several minori-
ties [may combine] their several proposals as different provisions of a
single bill and thus consolidat[e] their votes so that a majority is obtained
for the omnibus bill where perhaps no single proposal ... could have
obtained majority approval separately."'9
Furthermore, the single subject rule protects the governor's veto pre-
rogative by "prevent[ing] the legislature from forcing the governor into a
take-it-or-leave-it choice when a bill addresses one subject in an odious
manner and another subject in a way the governor finds meritorious. '"
The rule is "intended to prohibit [ ] anti-majoritarian tactic[s]:'" In a
word, the single subject rule protects the decision of the legislators and
governor on each individual legislative proposal.
Hammerschmidt v. Boone County9 is a classic case of a single sub-
ject violation. Two very narrow bills relating to the conduct of elections
were combined,98 and thereafter provisions relating to the form of county
governance were added. 99 There was no "rational unity"10° between the
provisions relating to election procedures and those relating to county
governance, and no reason except "tactical convenience"' 0'1 for combining
them in a single bill. Election procedures and county governance cannot
be reconciled as parts of any single subject. No title could be written to
express a single subject incorporating both of these elements.
Another good example is People v. Cervantes,m' an Illinois case. A
bill originally relating to community service sentencing was amended
several times during the course of its consideration. ' 3 As passed, the bill
expanded the offenses for which a minor can be tried as an adult, per-
mitted longer sentences for felonies committed in furtherance of the ac-
(1875)).
93 Ruud, supra note 7, at 391.
9 Id. at 391; see also Catalano, supra note 2, at 79.
95 Hammerschmidt, 877 SAV.2d at 102.
96 Catalano, supra note 2, at 79. Courts also suggest that the single subject rule facili-
tates deliberation. See, e.g., People v. Reedy, 708 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (11. 1999). Ruud
notes that the purpose of facilitating orderly deliberation, however, "relates to legislative
procedure; [these rules do] not aim to eradicate devices designed to pervert the rule of
majority vote but rather to eliminate rambling, discursive deliberations:' Ruud, supra note
7, at 391. If the single subject rule were designed only to facilitate deliberation, it "could
have been left to the legislative rules to treat." Id. at 391.
877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
" The court apparently assumed that the subjects of these two original bills were fairly
related to each other, so that the combined bill contained a single subject-elections. Id. at
99. This assumption seems correct.
9 Id. at 100.
l00 Ruud, supra note 7, at 411.
01 Id. at 411.
1- 723 N.E.2d 265 (111. 1999).
,03 Id. at 268-69.
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tivities of a gang, amended sentences for driving while intoxicated, ad-
justed sentences for drug offenses, and amended various other sentencing
provisions." 4 All of these provisions were found to be related to the
amended bill's subject matter, neighborhood safety. ' 5 Portions of the bill
relating to the licensing of youth correctional facilities and welfare pro-
gram vendor fraud, however, were held to relate to other subjects uncon-
nected with neighborhood safety.'06
2. Clear Title
Two distinct purposes support the clear title requirement.) 7 Most
importantly, the requirement "is designed to assure that the people are
fairly apprised ... of the subjects of legislation that are being considered
in order that they have [an] opportunity of being heard thereon."'0 3 Sec-
ondarily, by requiring the title to express the whole subject of the bill, 1' 9
the rule "defeats surprise within the legislative process"" 0 and prohibits a
legislator from "surreptitiously inserting unrelated amendments into the
body of a pending bill.""' These two purposes reflect a widespread con-
cern with special interest legislation in the nineteenth century." 2 The
clear title rule, properly understood, safeguards openness and honesty in
the legislative process and facilitates public participation.
There are two common variations of clear title violations: overly
broad, "amorphous""' 3 titles and under-inclusive titles.
,o4 Id. at 269.
105 See id. at 270.
106 Id. at 271-73.
107See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Md. 1990) (stating that
the goals of single subject and clear title rules "are related [but] can also be quite dis-
tinct").
101Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102; see also 1A SINGER, supra note 9, § 18.02, at
27 (stating that the primary purpose of the clear title rule is to ensure reasonable notice to
legislators and the public); State ex rel. Lambert v. County Comm'n, 452 S.E.2d 906, 915
(W. Va. 1994); Patrice v. Murphy, 966 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Wash. 1998); La. Seafood Mgmt.
Council v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n, 715 So. 2d 387, 394 (La. 1998);
McCoy v. VanKirk, 500 S.E.2d 534, 546 (W. Va. 1997); Tenn. Mun. League v. Thompson,
958 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Tenn. 1997).
109 See Natural Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir., Dept. of Natural Res., 964 S.W.2d
818, 821 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (discussing "commonality" of subjects in a bill).
"OHammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 101; see also Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Iowa Util.
Bd., 570 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 1997); Lambert, 452 S.E.2d at 915; Associated Builders
& Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Minn. 2000); Hussey v. Chatham County,
494 S.E.2d 510, 511 (Ga. 1998); Tenn. Mun. League, 958 S.W.2d at 336.
" Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 101; see also IA SINGER, supra note 9, § 18.02, at
27; McGlothren v. E. Shore Family Practice, 742 So. 2d 173, 177 (Ala. 1999); McCoy, 500
S.E.2d at 546; Lutz v. Foran, 427 S.E.2d 248, 251 (Ga. 1993).
112 See Popkin, supra note 7, at 553 (suggesting that the concern with private interest
legislation is behind all state constitutional restrictions on legislative procedure).
113 St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W. 2d 145, 147 (Mo. 1998) (en banc)
(referring to the title: "related to certain incorporated and non-incorporated entitites").
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St. Louis Health Care Netvork v State"4 is a paradigmatic case of an
amorphous title so broad that it gave no notice of the contents of the
bill."5 This Article classifies St. Louis Health Care Network as a clear
title case rather than a single subject case precisely because the title is so
vague that one cannot discern from it what the bill itself provides. Clear
title is properly the basis on which this case was resolved.
National Solid Waste Managentent Ass'n v. Director, Department of
Natural Resources"6 is a paradigmatic case of an under-inclusive title.
The title--"relating to solid waste management"-accurately described
the subject of most of the bill's provisions, but failed to give any hint of
its application to hazardous waste." 7 As a result, the title failed to pro-
vide notice of a portion of the bill's subject. The court assumed that the
bill's two aspects, solid waste and hazardous waste, could be reconciled
as part of a broader subject,"' but because the title failed to express the
full extent of the bill's subject, the court invalidated the law."19
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the original purpose, sin-
gle subject, and clear title provisions, though related, are distinct. The
original purpose requirement allows legislators to monitor vast numbers
of bills by reference to their titles, confident that each bill's original pur-
pose will remain reasonably constant throughout the process of consid-
eration. It also secures adequate time for the consideration of each pro-
posal by preventing late amendments that drastically alter the bill. The
single subject rule assures that legislators and the governor can make a
choice based upon the merits of legislation on each subject by preventing
them from having to swallow unrelated bitter provisions with the sweet.
Finally, the clear title rule protects the right of the public to know the
subjects of legislation being considered and to voice opinions on meas-
ures of concern to them, and protects against fraudulent or surreptitious
legislation.
I. THE CASE STUDY
Missouri's constitution contains typical original purpose,'2 single
subject,'2' and clear title'2 provisions. Litigation challenging statutes for
alleged violations of these procedural requirements has long been a sta-
114 Id.
15 Id. at 145. This bill also suffered from a single subject violation. Id. at 146 (de-
scribing provisions relating to venue, terms of office for directors of nonprofit corpora-
tions, charitable gift annuities, and same-sex marriage).
116 964 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).7 Id. at 821-22.
18 See id.
119 Id.
120 Mo. CoNsT. art. 111, § 21.
2 1 Id. § 23.
-L Id. § 23.
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ple of the Missouri Supreme Court's docket. 123 But the flow of cases has
recently swelled: since 1994, the Missouri Supreme Court has decided no
fewer than ten. 124 These ten decisions serve as a case study for analysis of
the three procedural challenges. Because nearly every state's constitution
contains similar procedural requirements, this Article's analysis is rele-
vant not only for Missouri, but for most other states as well. This Part
presents a chronology of the ten recent cases discussed throughout the
Article. It then offers a preliminary assessment of the Missouri Supreme
Court's analysis.
A. Chronology
In 1994, the Missouri Supreme Court decided Hammerschmidt v.
Boone County.'15 Hammerschmidt was the first case to invalidate a statute
on procedural grounds in three decades. 126 As such, the case marks a
turning point in the Missouri Supreme Court's posture toward, and analy-
sis of, procedural claims. The plaintiff in Hammerschmidt challenged a
1993 statute that authorized certain counties, including Boone County, to
adopt county constitutions. The new statute also authorized the county
to call an election for the purpose of having voters approve the initiation
of the process of framing a county constitution. 28 These provisions gov-
erning the drafting of county constitutions were inserted by adoption of
an amendment on the house floor after two separate bills had been com-
bined into a single piece of legislation and reported out of committee. 2 9
Missouri House Bill 551 originally dealt with voter registration by
mail.3 0 Missouri House Bill 552 originally concerned mail ballots.1 3' Ac-
cording to its title, the bill as finally passed "relat[ed] to elections."' 3 2 The
plaintiff claimed single subject and clear title violations.'33 The Missouri
Supreme Court held that the bill contained two subjects: elections and
123 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495, 497 (Mo. 1870) (noting that the single subject
and clear title provision "has of late been several times before this court"); State ex rel.
Normandy Sch. Dist. v. Small, 356 S.W.2d 864, 876 (Mo. 1962) (Storckman, J., dissent-
ing) (describing a series of school cases alleging single subject and clear title violations);
National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir., Dept. of Natural Res., 964 S.W.2d 818, 819
(Mo. 1998) (en banc) (noting that the court has had "numerous opportunities" in recent
years to examine such claims).
124 See supra note 32. Appendix II indicates which of the three claims were raised and
decided in each case.
25 877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1994).
12 See supra note 27.
127Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 100 (describing H.B. 551, 87th Gen. Assem., 1st
Sess. (Mo. 1993), and H.B. 552, 87th Gen. Assem., 1st. Sess. (Mo. 1993)).
128 Id.




133 Id. at 100-01.
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county governance. 134 The court severed the portion relating to county
governance and allowed the rest of the statute to stand.'
In 1996, the court decided Akin v. Director of Revenue,26 a case that
raised original purpose and single subject claims. 37 The bill at issue was
called the "Outstanding Schools Act'"- Most of its provisions estab-
lished new educational programs, but the bill also amended tax rates and
deductions. 39 The tax provisions raised revenue to pay for only the new
educational programs."40 The court found no original purpose or single
subject violation.' 4'
The following year, the court decided four cases. Carmack '. Direc-
tor of Missouri Department of Agriculture'2 raised only a single subject
claim.4 3 This case involved a lengthy bill "relating to economic devel-
opment" 144 The bill included a provision regarding the compensation
formula when the state veterinarian orders the slaughter of diseased live-
stock.45 Closely following Hanmmerschmidt's analysis, the court found
that the bill contained more than one subject.'"
Fust v. Attorney General'" involved a tort reform bill intended to
"assure[ ] just compensation for certain person's [sic] damages.""S In
addition to modifying tort liability and insurance rules and trial proce-
dures in cases involving punitive damages, the bill established a "tort
victims' compensation fund." 149 The latter provision was challenged on
single subject and clear title grounds.' 0 The court found no violation.,,
In Missouri Health Care Ass'n v. Attorney General,15" the court con-
sidered a bill regulating long-term care.'5 The Department of Social
Services was to enforce most of the bill's provisions and was mentioned
in the bill's title. One provision, however, regulated advertising by nurs-
ing homes, and was to be enforced by the Attorney General." The plain-
l Id. at 103.
135 Id. at 104.
13934 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1996).
w Id. at 297.
13 Id.
13 9 Id.
'4 Id. at 302.
141 Id.
142945 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. 1997).
143 Id. at 958.
4 Id. at 957.
14 Id.
46Id. at 961.




5 Id. at 428.
' 953 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1997).
5 Id. at 619.
4 Id. at 623.
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 119 2001
Harvard Journal on Legislation
tiff raised original purpose, single subject, and clear title claims.' 5' The
court held that the bill contained two subjects, violating the single sub-
ject requirement. 156
The final case decided in 1997 posed the question of how the proce-
dural requirements apply when a bill results from a combination of bills
introduced separately. Stroh Brewery Co. v. State17 involved amendments
to liquor control laws. 5 The final bill was a culmination of three meas-
ures which originally regulated separate, and relatively narrow, aspects of
the sale of alcoholic beverages. Prior to passage, a provision was added
requiring beer sold in Missouri to bear a label indicating where it was
produced. '59 The plaintiff claimed original purpose and single subject
violations. 60 The court found no violation.' 6'
In 1998, the court decided three more cases. National Solid Waste
Management Ass'n v. Director, Department of Natural Resources 62 in-
volved a bill regulating solid waste management, a matter defined as dis-
tinct from hazardous waste,' 63 but a last-minute amendment extended
certain provisions of the bill to apply to hazardous waste as well. 64 The
bill's title, however, only referred to solid waste.' 65 The plaintiff raised all
three procedural challenges."6 The court found a clear title violation,
holding that the title was fatally under-inclusive. 67 The court then "ac-
complished" severance "by restricting the application of the statute"''6 to
solid waste, of which the title gave adequate notice. 69
The next case, St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 70 was also
decided on clear title grounds, although the plaintiff raised all three
claims.' 7' The bill's title, "relating to certain incorporated and non-
incorporated entities," was held to be so broad as to be meaningless and
incapable of expressing any single subject. 72 Because the bill's title gave
1551 d. at 619.
1-6 Id. at 623.
157 954 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. 1997).
I's Id. at 324-25.
159 Id. at 325.
160 Id. at 324.
161 Id.
162 964 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1998).
163 Id. at 820.
164 Id.
165 Id.
'16 See id. at 819.
167 Id. at 821.
168 Id. at 822. Severance "by application" occurs when, because the provisions are not
capable of severance in fact, the court "limit[s] [the] statute to less than all of the applica-
tions called for by its own terms." 2 SINGER, supra note 9, § 44.15, at 542. Some courts
disapprove of this practice because it "amounts to judicial amendment" of the statute. 2
SINGER, supra note 9, § 44.15, at 542.
169 Solid Waste Mgmt., 964 S.W.2d at 822.
170 968 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998).
'71 Id. at 146.
172 Id. at 148.
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no meaningful notice of its contents, the entire bill was held unconstitu-
tional."
Corvera v. Abatement Technologies, Inc. it Air Conservation
Comm'n'74 involved another bill that combined three measures that had
been introduced separately. 75 The three original bills related to asbestos
abatement, underground storage tanks, and water well drillers.'76 The
combined bill's title said it related to "environmental control"'" The
plaintiff challenged the bill on single subject and clear title grounds."3
The court found both requirements to be satisfied and upheld the stat-
ute.
179
Finally, in March 2000, the court decided C.C. Dillon v. City of
Eureka.'" Throughout the legislative process, the bill in Dillon related,
according to its title, to "transportation."' 8' Originally, the bill was very
narrow, creating a legislative oversight committee on transportation and
defining a single position on a transportation commission.' As passed,
the bill contained several provisions relating to organizational structure,
salaries and employment in the Department of Transportation, and also
allowed cities and counties to regulate billboards.ln The bill was chal-
lenged on original purpose, single subject, and clear title grounds.1" The
court found no violation.'1s
B. Preliminary Assessment
Together, these ten cases provide a compact case study for analysis
of original purpose, single subject, and clear title claims while simulta-
neously offering multiple variations on each claim. Their facts involve a
variety of legislative topics as well as several common legislative prac-
tices.
This case study suggests several preliminary conclusions. First, the
presumption of statutory validity still appears to hold, although its effect
is not as overwhelming as in the past. Second, litigants generally raise
more than one of the procedural claims (and often all three)-perhaps
because they cannot differentiate among them under the recent cases.
Finally, among the three claims, courts are more likely to find single
7 Id. at 149.
174 973 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1998).
175 Id. at 860.
176 Id.
177 Id.
179 Id. at 862.
110 12 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. 2000).81 Id. at 329.
"2See S. 883, 89th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998) (as introduced).
1 Dillon, 12 S.W.3d at 326.
1S4 Id. at 324-25.
'M5 Id. at 328-30.
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subject and clear title violations. The Missouri Supreme Court appears
reluctant to decide original purpose claims, as its posture in the original
purpose cases has been exceedingly deferential.
One cannot help but wonder why the Missouri Supreme Court has
heard so many procedural challenges. This Article offers two explana-
tions. First, the court's still-deferential posture encourages (at least indi-
rectly) litigation of these claims. 6 The court did sustain procedural
challenges in Hammerschmidt, Carmack, Missouri Health Care Ass'n,
Solid Waste Management, and St. Louis Health Care Network. As a re-
sult, the court's posture in procedural challenge cases appears less defer-
ential than it was as recently as two decades ago.'87 But in other cases,
particularly Stroh and Dillon, the court found no violation despite con-
siderable evidence of a hasty process, including last-minute alterations of
the bills. The court in these latter two cases adopted an extremely defer-
ential posture. The Missouri cases may bear out the conclusion that lax
enforcement leads to an increased number of violations. 88
The second reason for the increased number of claims is that the
ambiguities of recent decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court may en-
courage litigants to bring suit. The court's inability to articulate meaning-
ful standards stems primarily from its failure to separate the three claims
properly, particularly with respect to the underlying rationales they are
designed to serve. 89 For example, Hammerschmidt describes the single
subject rule as a "corollary" to the original purpose rule, and notes that
"[t]ogether, these constitutional provisions serve 'to facilitate orderly
legislative procedure."' ' 90 The opinion goes on to list five purposes col-
lectively served by the three constitutional requirements: to facilitate
understanding and discussion of the issues presented by each bill; to pre-
vent logrolling; to defeat surprise in the legislative process; to provide
fair notice to the public of the subjects of legislation being considered;
186See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn.
2000) (asserting that "the more deference shown by the courts ... , the bolder become
those who would violate [the constitutional restrictions]" and implying that challenges
would follow) (quoting State ex. rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Minn.
1986) (Yetka, J., concurring)). See generally Chambers, supra note 14 (indicating that the
Illinois single subject rule had been "dormant," causing lawmakers to think "the high court
had given them the leeway to build larger bills"); Williams, supra note 1, at 800 (suggest-
ing that increased judicial enforcement could result in greater legislative compliance).
187 In 1984, one judge charged, "it is time this Court developed meaningful standards
to evaluate legislation challenged under §§ 21 and 23." Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Co. v.
King, 664 S.W.2d 2, 7 (Mo. 1984) (Welliver, J., dissenting) (observing that the court had
not sustained a procedural challenge in 20 years).
is' See Associated Builders & Contractors, 610 N.W.2d at 301; Chambers, supra note
14 (stating that the increased number of cases stems from the legislature's recent tendency
toward "carelessly enacting bigger bills").
189 Cf. Chambers, supra note 14 (asserting that the increased number of single subject
challenges in Illinois stems from the Illinois Supreme Court's failure to "state[ ] clearly
what standard the rule demands").
190 877 S.W.2d at 101 (quoting Ruud, supra note 7, at 391).
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and to preserve intact the governor's veto power.191 The opinion fails to
articulate which of these purposes is fulfilled by each provision.
This Article contends that much of the difficulty evident in the re-
cent cases flows directly from the Hannzerschmidt opinion. To some ex-
tent, its muddling of the claims is attributable to rhetorical imprecision.
The words "subject" and "purpose" for example, are sometimes used
interchangeably in ordinary speech. 9- That the Missouri Supreme Court
has done likewise in its opinions is part of the problem. The Hammer-
schmidt opinion discusses all three constitutional limitations-original
purpose, single subject, and clear title-even though the plaintiff raised
only the latter two, and the court decided only the single subject claim. In
a particularly confusing passage, the court stated: "To the extent the bill's
original purpose is properly expressed in the title to the bill, we need not
look beyond the title to determine the bill's subject."'93 Subsequent cases
continued to treat distinct claims as if they were the same. In Akin, for
example, the court's discussion of the original purpose claim seems to
rely on a single subject analysis.'9 More recently, the court asserted that
its analysis of germaneness for an original purpose claim could serve
without further elaboration to decide whether all provisions of the bill
fairly related to each other for purposes of a single subject claim.1' The
failure to classify claims rigorously is a large part of the confusion.9 6
In Hammerschmidt, the court compounded rhetorical imprecision in
analyzing the three claims by outlining an analytical framework not
called for by the case itself and unsupported by the constitution and the
191 Id. at 101-02. This passage is essentially repeated in Stroh, 954 S.V.2d at 325-26.
192See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1847 (1981). The third
definition of purpose links it with subject: "A subject under discussion:' Id.
193 Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102 (emphasis added). Fust contains an equally
mystifying passage describing how violations of the clear title mandate may occur
First, the subject may be so general or amorphous as to violate the single subject
requirement. Second, the subject may be so restrictive that a particular provision
is rejected because it falls outside the scope of the subject.
Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Mo. 1997) (en bane) (citation omitted).
11" Akin v. Dir. of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d. 295, 302 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (finding no
original purpose violation because "each provision of the bill related to education").
9 C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Mo. 2000) (en bane).
19 As an example, one commentator incorrectly stated that "every single subject case
which has reached the level of appeal has been on the basis of an alleged violation of the
clear title provision.' Stearley, supra note 30, at 47 (citing Mo. Health Care Ass'n, Fust.
Hammerschmidt, and Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d
824 (Mo. 1990)). To the contrary, Missouri Health Care Ass'n and Hammerschmidt were
decided on the subject claim, but the court used the title to determine subject. Hammer-
schmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102-03; Mo. Health Care Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 953 S.W.2d 617,
622-23 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). Fust decided both claims. Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 428-29. Ini-
tiative Process, 799 S.W.2d at 826, decided a subject claim regarding a proposed constitu-
tional amendment, for which there is no clear title requirement. See Mo. CONsT. art. I1.
§ 50.
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court's precedents. 97 Most notably, the court relied too heavily upon the
bill's title to determine its subject. Subsequent cases attempted to follow
Hammerschmidt's prescriptions, but, not surprisingly, Hammerschmidt's
rhetorical imprecision and analytical weakness have led to confusion sur-
rounding the proper test for compliance with the constitutional require-
ments. 98 Precise analytical separation of the original purpose, single
subject, and clear title provisions is a difficult task, but it is essential to
the proper resolution of such cases.
III. THE PROPER ANALYSIS
This Part provides a framework for analyzing original purpose, sin-
gle subject, and clear title claims. The most salient characteristic of this
framework is that it treats each of the constitutional procedural restric-
tions independently, and links the test for compliance with each to the
specific objectives it is designed to serve. Thus, a critical step in the
analysis of original purpose claims is to distinguish purpose from subject
and to focus on changes during the legislature's consideration of the bill.
In analyzing single subject claims, it is essential to examine the provi-
sions of the bill to determine their relationship to each other, not merely
to the bill's title. For clear title claims, it is necessary to examine the title
in relation to the body of the bill to assess whether adequate notice was
provided. To frame the discussion, this Part presents in more detail the
Missouri Supreme Court's analysis of each claim. It then outlines the test
for compliance, taking account of the purposes each particular constitu-
tional prohibition is designed to serve.' This Part also applies the pro-
posed analysis to selected recent cases in order to test its validity.
A. Original Purpose
Missouri's original purpose rule prohibits a bill from being amended
during the course of its consideration "so ... as to change its original
purpose." 2 The Missouri Supreme Court has been extremely deferential
in its approach to original purpose claims.2 0' In the ten cases under dis-
197 First, the court concludes that a bill's subject includes all matters that "fall within
or reasonably relate" to its "general core purpose." 877 S.W.2d at 102. Then the court
looks to the title of the bill to determine the bill's purpose or subject. Id. Finally, if the title
is "amorphous," the court turns to the "organization of the constitution" for guidance in
determining what is a single subject. Id. at 102 n.3.
198 See infra notes 313-315.
199 At least one court has recognized that decisions must take account of the reasons
behind the rule. See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1121 (Md. 1990). Many
of the opinions recite the reasons behind the constitutional restrictions. See supra notes 70,
90-91, and 109-111.200 Mo. CONST. art. III, § 21. For similar provisions in other states, see Appendix I.
201 The annotations to article III, section 21 reveal only one case in which the court in-
validated a statute on original purpose grounds: Allied Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bell, 185
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cussion, the court reached the original purpose claim only three times, in
Akin, Stroh, and Dillon. Each time, the court found that no change in the
bill's purpose had occurred. Original purpose challenges were raised, but
not decided, in Missouri Health Care Ass'n, Solid Waste Management,
and St. Louis Health Care Network. Highest state courts have decided
only three original purpose claims since 1990, :21 finding violations in two
of them.203
In Akin, the subject of the bill at issue, according to the court, was
"education' 2 4 Because there is no requirement that the bill's purpose be
expressed in the title, the bill's purpose must be discerned from its provi-
sions. Part of the bill was identified as the "Outstanding Schools Act," '
which reduced class size, created the "A+ Schools Program" increased
teacher training, and upgraded vocational and technical education, among
other things.2t The challenged provision allowed specified new tax reve-
nues to be "transfer[red] monthly from general revenue ... to the out-
standing schools trust fund established in ... this act."- 7 The court held
that the tax measure was part and parcel of the purpose of the act: to im-
prove education in Missouri's schools." Though the tax provision af-
fected general taxes, 209 its purpose was not to raise general revenue but to
finance the specific educational programs established by the bill?'0 The
addition of the tax provision did not change the purpose of Missouri Sen-
ate Bill 380.
Stroh and Dillon are more problematic. The Stroh opinion fails to
identify the purpose of the bill independently of its title.21' The court ap-
peared to characterize the purpose of the bill as one to amend the liquor
control law.212 Accordingly, the court stated that the test was whether the
S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1945). See Mo. ANN. STAT., Mo. CONST. art. 111, § 21 (West 2000). Judge
Price, dissenting in Solid Waste Management, made the opposite point that the court's duty
is to defer to the legislature, upholding legislation unless it "'clearly and undoubtedly'
violates the constitutional limitation:' Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir., Dep't of
Natural Res., 964 S.W.2d 818, 823 (Mo. 1998) (en bane). Judge Price authored the court's
opinions in Stroh and Dillon, the two original purpose cases this Article characterizes as
most deferential. However, both of these decisions were unanimous, suggesting that the
court shares Judge Price's deferential approach, at least in the original purpose cases.
202 Barcklay v. Melton, 5 S..3d 457 (Ark. 1999); Advisory Opinion No. 331, 582 So.
2d 1115 (Ala. 1991); Bills v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990).
'm Barcklay, 5 SAV.3d at 459-60; Advisory Opinion No. 331, 582 So. 2d at 1117-18.
204 Akin v. Dir. of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Mo. 1996) (en bane). The opinion
later identifies the purpose of the bill as relating to "education:' Id. at 302.
20 ld. at 297.
206 S. 380, 87th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., § 1 (Mo. 1993).
l §A.1.
w2 Akin, 934 S.W.2d at 302.
209 Specifically, the measure increased the corporate income tax rate and limited the
deduction for federal income taxes paid by individuals and corporations. Id. at 297.210 Id. at 302 (discussing the single subject claim).
211 Stroh, 954 SAV.2d at 326 (noting that the "title stated the purpose of the bill").
212 d. at 325.
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bill's provisions were germane to that purpose.21 3 The bill at issue in
Stroh was a combination of three separately introduced bills that con-
cerned various aspects of the sale of alcoholic beverages. 24 The com-
bined bill went forward as House Committee Substitute for Senate Bill
933.215 As introduced, Missouri Senate Bill 933 contained only one sec-
tion, relating to auctions of vintage wine.216 As finally passed, the sub-
stitute bill "'relat[ed] to intoxicating beverages.' '2 1 7 It repealed eight
statutory sections and enacted nine new sections. 218 The new sections in-
volved a variety of matters concerning intoxicating beverages, including
the challenged provision on beer labeling.29 The court ruled that neither
Missouri Senate Bill 933's original title nor its original text restricted the
bill's original purpose to the regulation of vintage wine auctions. 220 The
court stated that "[f]urther language of specific limitation, such as 'for
the sole purpose of"' would be required to support an original purpose
claim.' Because all versions of the bill "amended chapter 311 ... the
purpose of [the bill] [was] consistent throughout its legislative history. 222
The court's analysis confuses purpose with subject and gives short shrift
to the limitation that article III, section 21 imposes.
Dillon continues along the same path of extreme deference in ana-
lyzing original purpose. There, a bill "relating to transportation" was
amended to include provisions allowing cities and counties to regulate
billboards more restrictively than does the state.223 The bill originally re-
pealed one section relating to the chief highway engineer 24 and enacted
in its place two new ones pertaining to "the position of the chief execu-
tive officer ... of the highways and transportation commission" '  As
passed, it repealed five sections and added seven new ones.226 The new
provisions concerned accounting for transportation project funds; high-
way patrol members' salary increases; the organization of the Missouri
Department of Transportation; audits of the highway commission; and-
the provision at issue-city and county regulation of billboards. 2 7 Recit-
ing the test that new matter must be "germane" to the bill's original pur-
213 Id. at 326.214 Id. at 324-25.
21
-Id. at 325.
2 16 Id. at 326.
217 Id. at 327.
218 Id. at 325.
219 Id.
2 0 Id. at 326.
22 Id.
m"2 Id.
m Dillon, 12 S.W.3d at 325.
n
4 See S. 883, 89th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998) (referring to the repeal of Mo.
REv. STAT. § 226.040 (Supp. 1997)).
225 Dillon, 12 S.W.2d at 326; Mo. S. 883 (repealing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 43.020, 71.228,
226.005, 226.040, 226.140).
Dillon, 12 S.W.2d at 326.
27 Id.
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pose, the court found the requirement satisfied because billboards "have
been inextricably linked to highway transportation by federal and state
legislation." This linkage between state and federal legislation demon-
strated that "these subjects are germane to one another.'2 ' The very
statement of the court's conclusion in Dillon begs the question of a
change in original purpose. Indeed, the provision at issue permitted local,
not state, regulation of billboards, making the purported connection be-
tween billboards and highway transportation irrelevant. In both Stroh and
Dillon, the court adopted an overly deferential posture, assumed that
purpose and subject were the same, and examined only the bills' titles.
Proper analysis of compliance with the original purpose limitation re-
quires a reexamination of all three of these elements.
1. Deferential Posture
The Missouri Supreme Court appears reluctant to decide original
purpose claims.230 This reluctance probably reflects a desire to avoid ex-
amining the entire legislative process, as would be required in order to
decide an original purpose claim. Doing so could appear to offend the
dignity of the legislature as a coordinate branch of government.Y3 Origi-
2Id. at 327. In Solid Waste Management, Judge Price suggested a similar role for
federal environmental legislation to establish a "close relationship" between hazardous and
solid waste. 964 S.W.2d at 824 (Price, J., dissenting); cf. Figinsky, supra note 29, at 382-
83 (describing the use of federal/state cooperation in welfare programs to establish a
"nexus" between child support enforcement provisions and AFDC). Comments on the
propriety of using federal law in this manner are beyond the scope of this Article. For pre-
sent purposes, it is sufficient to note that the original purpose of the bill at issue in Dillon
did not in fact extend to all aspects of transportation.
=9 Dillon, 12 S..3d at 328.
230 In Missouri Health Care Ass'n, Solid Waste Management, and St. Louis Health
Care Network, the court passed over this claim to decide the case on either single subject
or clear title grounds. In each of these cases, the court's recitation of the facts suggests that
an original purpose violation might have occurred. See Mo. Health Care Ass'n, 953 S.W.2d
at 619-20; Solid Waste Mgmt., 964 S.W.2d at 819; St. Louis Health Care Network. 968
S.W.2d at 146. To be fair, the court sometimes advances a reason for taking up one of the
other challenges instead. In Solid Maste Management, the court assumed arguendo that the
bill's original purpose encompassed all of the provisions eventually passed, although the
court held that the bill contained a clear title violation. 964 SAV.2d at 820. In St. Louis
Health Care Network, the court first took up the state's first point on appeal, which hap-
pened to be a clear title argument. 968 S.V.2d at 147. In Missouri Health Care Ass'n, the
court simply announced that the "dispositive issue" was the single subject claim. 953
S.W.2d at 622. These reasons do not eliminate suspicion that the court prefers to avoid the
original purpose inquiry.
231 It is well established that judges overstep their bounds when they pass judgment on
the value or worthiness of the legislature's purpose. See KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: 20 QusrioNs 270 (1999) ("[E]xcept when statutory terms invite judges
to appraise issues from a moral perspective, judges should rarely rely explicitly on their
own moral views in statutory cases:') Thus, courts often decline to delve too deeply into
the legislative process. See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Kan.
1994) ("mhe wisdom or desirability of the legislation is not before us:'); Keyserling v.
Beasley, 470 S.E.2d 100, 101 (S.C. 1996) ("[Tlhe determination of the social and eco-
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nal purpose analysis also would be frustrated, to some degree, by the lack
of published legislative history in Missouri and many other states. Nev-
ertheless, the original purpose claim is of equal import with any other
constitutional claim. 2 Thus, the court should not shy away from decid-
ing an original purpose claim when the facts suggest that a change in
original purpose has occurred. 233
The Missouri Supreme Court should recognize that an overly defer-
ential posture is no more faithful to separation of powers principles than
is an overly active one.234 The people, through the constitution, have es-
tablished limitations on the powers of all branches of government, in-
cluding the legislative branch. Original purpose provisions are important
limitations on the legislative process, born of deep distrust of corrupt
legislative practices. 235 That distrust has not abated,236 and the procedural
nomic desirability of [the statute] is not before this Court."). Courts also likely recognize
that the "purpose" of a measure includes a wide range of considerations, including the
need to introduce measures of interest to constituents, even if the legislator believes noth-
ing will come of them. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 9, at 27 (stating that "legislators
will introduce legislation in response to almost any demand from constituents, lobbyists, or
other interest groups"). See generally Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and
Engagement: The Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. O'Neil-and a Proposed Solution,
29 CONN. L. REV. 1115, 1132-34 (1997) (describing, in the context of institutional reform
litigation, the state courts' heightened "sensitivity to the constitutional authority of coordi-
nate branches of the government" and linking deferential posture to the fact that most state
court judges are elected).
232The Missouri Supreme Court has not given this provision equal weight. The court
has shown a willingness to engage in a rigorous analysis of single subject and clear title
claims. The same cannot be said for its original purpose analysis in Stroh and Dillon,
where there were substantial changes in the objectives of the legislation prior to passage.
See supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text; supra notes 180-185 and accompanying
text.
233 The courts of other states seem to share Missouri's distaste for examining the leg-
islative process. See, e.g., Bayh v. Ind. State Bldg. and Constr . Trades Council, 674
N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind. 1996) (announcing that "political proceedings behind the passage of
an Act are not the proper consideration of a judicial body").
2-4 Cf. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992) (responding to a
separation of powers argument that the court should not infer a private cause of action by
saying that "selective abdication of the sort advocated here would harm separation of pow-
ers principles in another way, by giving judges the power to render inutile causes of action
authorized by Congress through a decision that no remedy is available").
235 Williams, supra note 1, at 798-99; Popkin, supra note 7, at 553-54. Term limits
express a similar distrust. See Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEo. L.J.
477, 480 (1992) (describing the view of proponents of term limits that legislators are unre-
sponsive to voters, most interested in their own careers, and beholden to special interests);
Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 88 (1997) (de-
scribing the argument for term limits that long legislative service makes legislators "cor-
rupt, arrogant, cynical, unprincipled, resistant to reform, sympathetic to special interest
groups, and out of touch with their electorate"); Adrianne G. Threatt, The Impact of Term
Limits on the Congressional Committee System, 6 GEo. MASON L. REV. 767, 771 (1998)
(describing the desire of term limits proponents to eliminate the voice of special interests
and shift the focus from local to national interests).
236 Term limits, added in recent years to many state constitutions, are the most recent
expression of the need to keep the legislature in check. See Threatt, supra note 235, at 767
(stating that "many states" adopted term limits in the 1990s); Editorial, Scaring Mississippi
Voters, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1995, at A18 (listing 23 states that adopted term limits be-
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limitations have not been repealed. 7 The legislature acts illegitimately
when it ignores constitutional limitations on its procedures. The consti-
tution implicitly directs the court to enforce these limitations, as litiga-
tion is the only way for the people to challenge statutes enacted through
faulty processes. In such cases, the court's duty is not to defer to the leg-
islative process but to enforce the terms of the constitution. - 8 This argu-
ment in no way contravenes the notion that courts should not second-
guess legislatures. The notion there is one of deference to results.' 9
Courts are not empowered to substitute their own wisdom for that of the
legislature. This Article speaks of deference only to process, and argues
that deference to a flawed process is improper.
2. Distinguishing Purpose from Subject
A second problem in the Missouri original purpose cases is the
court's failure to distinguish purpose from subject. In Akin, for example,
the court stated that the test for original purpose claims is whether the
bill as passed includes "matters not germane to the object of the legisla-
tion or unrelated to its original subject"'2* The court held that "the pur-
pose of S. 380 was consistent throughout, that purpose being a bill relat-
ing to education' 241 Education is not a "purpose" but a "subject." Purpose
and subject are not the same. According to one dictionary, "purpose" is
"an end or aim" or "an object, effect or result aimed at [or] intended.'2 2
tween 1990 and 1995); Elhauge, supra note 235. at 85 (stating that 24 states had adopted
term limits); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 917 n.39 (1995) (Thomas.
J., dissenting) (noting that 16 states had adopted some form of term limits prior to 1994
and that 6 more states did so in the 1994 elections).
2 See Williams, supra note 1, at 800 (noting that limits on legislative procedure have
survived and "continue to reflect important policies relating to the nature of the delibera-
tive process").
m- See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1100
(Ohio 1999) (indicating that non-enforcement of a constitutional restriction on legislative
procedure "would be no less than an abdication" of its duty) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted); Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111. 1118 (Md. 1990) (hold-
ing that despite the general posture of deference to the legislature, procedural restrictions
are "still part of our Constitution... [and] not to be treated as a dead letter"); Kincaid v.
Mangum, 432 S.E.2d 74, 82 (NV. Va. 1993) ("[The question of whether the legislature
might perform a task more efficiently if it did not have to follow the constitution is essen-
tially irrelevant. Since the constitution applies, the question of whether efficiency takes
primacy over other goals must be taken to have been answered by our constitutional fram-
ers") (quoting State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 778-79 (Alaska 1980)) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted); Patrice v. Murphy, 966 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Wash.
1998) (holding that the court's role is to "vouchsaf[e]" "serious constitutional interests").239 See supra note 231.
240 934 SAV.2d at 302 (emphasis added). According to the court, the appellant charac-
terized the alleged constitutional defect as a "chang[e] [in] subjects during the legislative
process." Id. at 297.
241 Id.242 WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrTIONARY 1847 (1981). Only the third
definition of purpose links it with subject: "A subject under discussion:' Id.
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"Subject," on the other hand, is "something that forms a basis (as for ac-
tion, study, [or] discussion): as ... something concerning which some-
thing is said or done: a thing ... treated of. 243 Perhaps simpler, "subject"
corresponds to grammatical subject and to the "subject term" of a logical
proposition;' "purpose" corresponds to the grammatical or logical
predicate.245 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recognized
this distinction when it commented that the legislature "undertakes to
legislate upon a particular subject for the accomplishment of a certain
object."2
This confusion is understandable: the bill titles themselves identify
subjects but not purposes. There is, of course, no requirement that the
purpose be expressed in the bill's title. And in Missouri, as in most
states, there is no published legislative history indicating how sponsors or
drafters have characterized their purposes. 247 Thus, the only way to de-
termine a bill's purpose is by a careful reading of its provisions. The
Missouri Supreme Court's opinions seldom attempt to identify the pur-
pose as this Article defines it, preferring simply to substitute the subject
recited in the bill's title. For example, the court has referred to "educa-
tion" 248 and "transportation"24 9 as "purposes." Plainly, these are subjects,
i.e., matters treated in bills. A bill's purpose is to achieve some end or
result with respect to its subject.
More important than dictionary definitions in distinguishing purpose
from subject is the constitution itself. Missouri's constitution contains
distinct limitations concerning the purpose and subject of a bill. 0 The
limitations are contained in two separate sections adopted ten years apart.
Having adopted the single subject limitation in 1865,251 the people of
Missouri apparently believed additional restrictions on the legislative
process were necessary. The original purpose limitation was adopted in
1875 202 and should be understood to have separate meaning and effect.
The single subject rule primarily protects legislators and the governor in
the moment of final decision on a bill.5 3 It does so by prohibiting the
bundling together of unrelated provisions to force the passage of provi-
43 Id. at 2275.244Id.
245 Id. at 1786 (defining "predicate" as "something that is affirmed or denied of the
subject in a proposition in logic").
m Kincaid v. Mangum, 432 S.E.2d 74, 80 (W. Va. 1993) (quoting Simms v. Sawyers,
101 S.E. 467 (W. Va. 1919)).
247 MORRIS L. COHEN, ROBERT C. BERRING, & KENT C. OLSON, How To FIND THE
LAW 189 (1989) (stating that there is "far less legislative history information available on
the state level" than there is for federal statutes).
248 Akin, 934 S.W.2d at 302.
249 Dillon, 12 S.W.3d at 328.
210 See Mo. CONsT. art. III, §§ 21, 23.
251 See supra note 62.
2'2 See supra note 62.
211 See supra Part I.B. 1.
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sions a legislator or governor abhors along with those she favors. The
original purpose rule ensures that the result sought remains more or less
constant (though the details may vary). This restriction goes well beyond
the simple prohibition on multiple subjects by limiting the legislature's
options even with respect to a single subject.
The leading treatise suggests that original purpose provisions help
enforce other constitutional limitations on the legislature.2m For example,
an original purpose provision prevents legislators from evading the con-
stitutional limit on the time for introduction of bills by substituting en-
tirely new content into bills already introduced.25 In fact, several of the
recent Missouri cases have involved the insertion into pending bills of
new legislative proposals after the deadline for introducing new bills had
passed.256 The original purpose limitation must be understood as going
beyond the single subject rule to create an independent restriction on the
legislative process.
The opinions, however, reveal that in cases presenting both original
purpose and single subject challenges, the Missouri Supreme Court sim-
ply performs the same analysis twice. Consider Dillon: "Our analysis in
determining that billboards are germane to transportation [the original
purpose analysis] also supports our determination ... that billboards
fairly relate to, or are naturally connected with, transportation [the single
subject test]2'7 The court is correct in that "germane:' "related," and
"connected" all mean about the same thing. "Germane" means "having a
close relationship." '5 Almost indistinguishably, "related" means "having
relationship: connected by means of an established or discoverable rela-
tion?' 259 "Connected" means "having the parts or elements logically re-
2 See 1 SINGER, supra note 9, § 9.05, at 580.
255 An Ohio case illustrates the link between various procedural restrictions. Ohio's
constitution contains a typical provision requiring each bill to be considered on three sepa-
rate days in each chamber. OHio CONsT. art. II, § 15(C). The plaintiffs claimed that a stat-
ute was enacted in violation of this provision when the version of the bill finally passed
was considered only once in each house. State ex reL Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631
N.E.2d 582, 587 (Ohio 1994). The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that there was no violation
of the three-consideration rule provided that the subject matter of the original bill was not
"vitally alter[ed]' id. at 589, and that the bill passed was not "completely different in
content" from the original, id. at 588. Though the Ohio constitution does not contain an
original purpose provision, the Ohio court implicitly recognized that other procedural re-
strictions are rendered ineffectual if a bill's content can be changed dramatically, espe-
cially near the end of the legislative session. Id. at 589.
251 See, e.g., St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.WV.2d 145, 146 (Mo. 1998)
(describing proposals inserted on the last day of the session); National Solid Waste Mgmt.
Ass'n v. Dir., Dept. of Natural Res., 964 S.W.2d 818, 819 (Mo. 1998) (describing propos-
als inserted two days before the end of the session). The situation appears much the same
in other states. See, e.g., Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d 1225, 1226-27 (Md. 2000) (describing
numerous changes to a bill during the last days of a session, including "tacking on" to one
bill the text of another bill which had been killed in committee the week before).
257 12 S.W.3d at 329 (emphasis added).
2' WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 951 (1981).
z9Id. at 1916.
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lated."216 Hence, while the constitution sets out two independent require-
ments, the Missouri Supreme Court uses an identical test for both. This
ignores the substantive distinction between the two and frustrates the
constitutional attempt to regulate the legislative process.
The root of the problem is the court's over-reliance on the title of the
bill to resolve both original purpose and single subject claims.26' The
court looks first at the title to determine the purpose or subject. With re-
spect to purpose this is an impossible task, for section 21 itself estab-
lishes no requirement that the bill's purpose be reflected in its title.262 In
Stroh, the Missouri Supreme Court explicitly linked analysis of the origi-
nal purpose requirement to the bill's title when, in a discussion of bill
titles, it stated that "only clear and undoubted language limiting purpose
will support an article III, section 21 challenge."2 63 The court went on to
examine the title of the bill at issue to determine whether its language
was so confined. 2 4 The court reduced analysis of the bill's purpose to the
title alone. This analytical framework departs from the court's prece-
dents. In Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach,265 for example, the court remarked
that the title "can be changed without violating Art. III, § 21. '"26 It is the
purpose itself that must not change.
In determining whether an original purpose violation has occurred,
the court should read all the provisions of the bill as introduced, deter-
mine the bill's objective, then read all of the provisions of the bill as
passed, instead of simply relying on the title. If the overall objective of
the bill as passed is consistent with the objective of the bill as introduced,
there is no original purpose violation. The proper analysis assigns no role
to the title of the bill.
3. Test for Compliance
The real difficulty in original purpose analysis is identifying the ap-
propriate level of generality at which to define the original purpose.
Defining purpose at too high a level of generality equates with excessive
deference, but defining purpose too narrowly "inhibit[s] the normal leg-
islative process[ ].-267 The test for original purpose violations asks
260 Id. at 480.
261 See infra notes 301-331 and accompanying text.
262 Mo. CONST. art. III, § 21. The word "title" appears in section 21 only once, in the
provision requiring that each bill be read by title on three different days in each house. Id.
The reading of bills by title gives the title a practical function, but does not suggest that the
title is in any way relevant to the legal analysis of an original purpose claim.263 Stroh, 954 S.W.2d at 326.
2 See id.
265636 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1982).
266 Id. at 38. This passage is quoted in Akin, 934 S.W. 2d at 302, suggesting that the
departure in Stroh is a recent one.
267 Stroh, 954 S.W. 2d at 326.
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whether new matters are germane to the original purpose of the bill.' 3
This test allows amendments to a bill extending or limiting its scope pro-
vided the new matter is germane.2 69 By allowing amendments so long as
they are germane to the original purpose, this test balances the harms that
could be caused by an overly deferential posture towards the legislature
against those that could be caused by constant interference with the leg-
islative process.
Some may argue that even this method of characterizing original
purpose unduly restricts the legislature. After all, if a legislator has the
votes to pass a measure not included in a bill already filed, the court
should not stand in the way of passage of that measure. -70 The reply is
two-fold. First, legislators have several options for introducing new
measures. When introducing bills in the first place, legislators can draft
them broadly enough to call for a reasonably expansive definition of their
purpose. As the Stroh court describes it, the sponsor has a "strategic
choice whether to introduce a bill whose broad purpose will accommo-
date late amendments that may in turn help the bill's chance of passage,
or to introduce a narrower bill, protecting the bill from undesired
amendments but perhaps lessening its likelihood of passage"'211 The con-
stitution does not require a narrow purpose. Holding legislators to the
"strategic choice" of drafting a narrow bill rather than allowing a change
in purpose does not overstep the court's bounds. Moreover, Missouri
legislators can file new bills at any time through the sixtieth day of the
legislative session.272 The constitution allows sufficient flexibility for the
legislature to do its work.
Second, if legislators have not taken advantage of those constitu-
tional options during the session, prevention of a non-germane measure's
enactment is exactly what the constitution requires. As noted earlierM
the addition of the original purpose rule to the Missouri Constitution in
1875 must have been meant to accomplish something beyond what the
single subject and clear title rules already required. One theory is that the
original purpose rule serves to enforce the constitution's separate limita-
tion on the time when new bills can be introduced.- 4 The time limitation
seems intended to prevent passage of new measures without sufficient
m Akin, 934 S.W.2d at 302.
269 See Stroh, 954 S.W.2d at 326 (citing Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach. 636 S.WV.2d 31.
38 (Mo. 1982)).
270 Cf. Patrick D. Hughes, Revisiting the Single-Subject Rule, CHI. DAILY L. BULL..
Feb. 9, 2000, at 15 ("The bills got the votes, and they were signed; that should ba that.")
(referring to single subject violations.).
27 954 S.W.2d at 326 (focusing on the title rather than provisions of the bill to define
purpose).
M" Mo. CONsm. art. II, § 25; see also I SINGER, supra note 9, § 9.04. at 579 (describ-
ing variations of this rule in other states).
m See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text.
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time for consideration. The danger of less-than-careful consideration is
the same whether it occurs with respect to a new bill or new contents in-
serted into a bill introduced earlier for other purposes.
Returning to the Missouri cases, a reading of the original bill in-
volved in Akin reveals that it was designed to establish a variety of
specific programs to improve education. The bill as introduced did not
purport to treat all or even most aspects of the subject of "education. '273
Fairly read, its purpose was to create specific programs to improve public
education. Defining purpose to match the scope of the provisions actually
introduced does not eviscerate section 21's provision that bills may be
amended during the course of consideration. Many details of the pro-
grams could be changed. Different programs designed to achieve the
same results as those originally proposed could be substituted without
changing the purpose of the bill and without violating section 21. In fact,
the court held that a tax measure, which was a new matter altogether,
could later be added to the bill as a mechanism for funding the programs
without violating the original purpose rule because it was germane to the
implementation of the programs delineated in the original bill. But other
matters, such as a change in the age until which children are required to
attend school, would be off-limits because they fall outside the original
purpose of the bill.276
Dillon is at the other end of the spectrum. There, the original bill
was extremely limited.277 While the bill title announced its subject to be
"transportation," the bill itself only set out to change the definition of a
particular position on a transportation-related commission. Though the
court accepted the argument that the bill's original purpose related to the
broad subject of transportation,278 the bill's provisions simply bely that
conclusion.279 The broadest purpose fairly attributable to this bill as filed
2-5 Missouri Senate Bill 380, 87th Gen. Assem., Ist Sess. (Mo. 1993), establishes a
"Commission on Performance," id. § 2; calls for statewide curriculum guidelines, id. § 3, a
statewide assessment system, id. § 4, and annual performance bonus awards, id. § 8; links
school accreditation to tax levy, id. § 9; sets criteria for approving teacher training pro-
grams, id. § 10; adjusts the state aid funding formula, id. passim; and provides for the dis-
tribution of the proceeds of riverboat gambling to various education funds, id. §§ 11-17.
276 A change in the age until which children are required to attend school would not be
permissible even though it is encompassed within the bill's subject, education.
27 S. 883, 89th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1998), is a two-page bill that repeals one
statutory section and enacts two new sections.
27' Dillon, 12 S.W.3d at 327 (describing the argument that the "bill as introduced per-
tained only to transportation" and stating that "Dillon's burden, then, is to demonstrate that
billboards are.., not germane to transportation").
279 As a matter of fact, the Missouri Senate's Web page describes the bill as "estab-
lishing accountability provisions for the Department of Transportation." http:llwww sen-
ate.state.mo.us/98bills/bills/SB883.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2000). The "Current Bill
Summary" states that the conference committee version of the act "contain[s] provisions
for accountability for the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission and the
Department of Transportation." Id. This description, while not authoritative, strongly sug-
gests that the bill's purpose was not nearly as broad as "transportation" Significantly, the
description continues: "Provisions about billboards, the Highway Patrol, the State Auditor,
[Vol. 38
HeinOnline  -- 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 134 2001
State Constitutions and Legislative Procedure
would be to modify the salaries and terms of employment of persons em-
ployed by the Department of Transportation and related boards and
commissions and, perhaps, to alter the organizational structure of the
department itself.2so Under this reading, the matters later added to Mis-
souri Senate Bill 883 pertaining to highway patrol salaries and to the or-
ganization of the Department of Transportation would be within the
original purpose. Those relating to accounting for transportation project
funds and to audits of the highway and transportation commission would
probably be invalid. The provisions allowing cities and counties to regu-
late billboards would clearly fall outside the purpose of the bill as origi-
nally introduced and are in no way germane to a bill proposing to alter
the conditions of employment of state transportation workers.
Stroh is a closer case. The final bill in that case was a combination of
three bills originally introduced as separate measures.nt Combining bills
is common and the court approves of this tactic: "Article I1, §21 was not
designed to inhibit the normal legislative processes, in which bills are
combined and additions necessary to comply with the legislative intent
are made.' The Stroh opinion focuses on the fact that all three bills
amended portions of chapter 311 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, relat-
ing to intoxicating beverages.3 The provisions of the three original bills
suggest that their purposes are best characterized as regulating the em-
ployment of persons under twenty-one years of age in selling or handling
intoxicating liquor;24 prohibiting distillers, wholesalers, brewers, and
other suppliers from having any financial interest in retail businesses that
sell intoxicating liquors and from furnishing any equipment, credit, or
property to retail dealers;2 and regulating auctions of vintage wine. s
Each of these purposes is narrower than the general subject of intoxicat-
ing beverages. The question is how to analyze original purpose in the
context of combined bills. Section 21 provides that "no bill shall be so
and contractors are also included." Id.
2See S. 883, § A (repealing Mo. REv. STAT. § 226.040 (Supp. 1997) (concerning the
appointment of a chief engineer and other employees of the transportation commission)
and enacting two new sections, section 226.008 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri (estab-
lishing the Joint Committee on Transportation Oversight), and section 226.040 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Missouri (requiring appointment of a director of the Missouri Department
of Transportation and other officers of the department)).
Even this reading is arguably much more expansive than the bill itself, but that may be
appropriate in order to allow the legislature sufficient leeway to exercise its will. The court
has repeatedly held that amendments to the bill may extend or limit its scope; "even new
matter is not excluded if germane:' Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Mo.
1997) (en banc) (citing Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Mo. 1982)).
211 Stroh, 954 S.W.2d at 324-25.
22Id. at 326 (quoting Blue Cross Hospital Serv., Inc. of Mo. v. Frappier, 681 S.V.2d
925, 929 (Mo. 1985)).
m Id. at 327.
214 H.R. 1470, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996).
2a S. 814, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996).
2S. 933, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996).
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amended ... as to change its original purpose."287 The court focused on
Missouri Senate Bill 933, the bill into which the other two bills were
combined, and struggled to find a way to hold that its original purpose
had not been changed. 8 Missouri Senate Bill 933's original purpose was
exceptionally narrow, and the court's conclusion that a bill regulating
wine auctions could encompass a beer labeling provision 289 is strained.
The better procedure for combined bills would be to permit the original
purpose of each bill to survive in the combined bill-essentially adding
them together.219 Doing so would hold the legislature to its original pur-
poses, as the constitution requires, but would also permit the practice of
combining bills.29' In Stroh, the combined purpose of the three original
bills concerns restrictions on the sale of intoxicating beverages. 292 Each
bill attempted to regulate a dangerous aspect of the sale of liquor: the
danger that underage persons will have access to liquor; the danger that
suppliers will induce sales of their products by providing samples, ad-
vertising materials, dispensing fixtures, or other gifts to retailers; and the
danger that fraud may occur in auctions of vintage wines. Reading the
combined purpose to encompass all of these matters would allow the ad-
dition of provisions relating to the issuance or conditions of liquor li-
censes to stand. But the provision at issue, a trade protection provision
relating to labeling of beer sold in Missouri, which was added during
floor debate on the combined bill,293 would fall outside the original pur-
pose because a provision aimed at providing a competitive advantage in
the marketplace to Missouri's beer producers is not germane to the origi-
nal purpose of any of the bills as introduced.
The court has considerable discretion in defining the original pur-
pose, though it must do so by analyzing the original bill's provisions, not
merely its title. And the test for germaneness is generous: it is not all that
difficult to show a relationship between two provisions, as Akin's holding
demonstrates. 294 But the court must enforce section 21 as it would any
other constitutional provision. It should not strain to find "germane" ad-
ditions clearly unrelated to a bill's original purpose under the guise of
getting out of the legislature's way.
2 Mo. CONST. art. III, § 21 (emphasis added).
2M Stroh, 954 S.W.2d at 324-27.
289 Id. at 325 (describing the bill); id. at 326 (finding no original purpose violation).
m9 This argument assumes that the combined purposes all relate to a single subject, as
they did in Stroh.
29, This proposal might seem to permit logrolling, but that evil is addressed by the sin-
gle subject rule, not the original purpose rule. Under the proposal, the combined bill would
still be required to have a single subject (here, intoxicating beverages) and, for that matter,
to have that subject clearly expressed in the bill's title.
m' 954 S.W.2d at 327.
m Id. at 325.
294 See Akin, 934 S.W.2d at 302.
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B. Single Subject
Article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution requires that each
bill be limited to one subject.295 The Missouri Supreme Court has long
held article I, section 23 to be mandatory, not discretionary.? But pro-
cedural limitations are interpreted liberally.29 As a result, the phrase "one
subject" is read broadly, "but not so broadly that the phrase becomes
meaningless' 29 The current test for compliance with the single subject
rule, articulated in Hammersclhmidt, has two elements. First, Hammer-
schmidt directs the court to look at the title to determine the bill's sub-
ject.219 This prong departs from the court's precedents by ignoring the
bill's provisions. In addition, Hannerschmidt looks to the separate
headings of the constitution in order to define what constitutes a single
subjectsre This prong is the result of Hannnerschmidt's crossing of two
lines of cases and is a poor fit for statutes. This section argues that single
subject analysis must focus on the bill's provisions, and identifies an al-
ternative external source for assessing single subject violations.
1. Relationship Among Provisions
Although the single subject restriction inherently relates to a bill's
contents, recent Missouri Supreme Court opinions focus on the title to
measure compliance with the rule. This practice arises, at least in part,
from the rhetorical imprecision recounted above. The confusion is com-
pounded by Hanrnerschmidt's pronouncement that the bill's title deter-
mines its subject.30' This test is a significant divergence from prior case
295 Mo. CoNsr. art. II, § 23. Section 23 provides two narrow exceptions not relevant to
this Article. The clear title provision of section 23 is discussed in the next section.
26 See Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.V.2d 98, 102 (Mo. 1994) (en banc)
(citing State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495 (1870)). Most other states agree. See, e.g., Associated
Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2000); Tenn. Mun. League
v. Thompson, 958 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tenn. 1997); Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Iowa Util. Bd.,
570 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Iowa 1997); Mclntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 846 (Or. 1996);
Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 306 (N.M. 1995); Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401,430-31 (Wyo.
1990). Ohio holds the rule to be directory only. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1098 (Ohio 1999).297Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102; see also supra notes 18-27 and accompanying
text.
m9 Hammersclunidt, 877 S..2d at 102.291dL
m Id. The implication is that a single subject must fall within one of the headings of
the constitution.
301 Id. at 102 n.3. This confusion is not unique to Missouri. In Illinois, some of the
opinions state that the bill's provisions must relate to each other. See, e.g., People v. Cer-
vantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 267 (IlL. 1999) ("[A] legislative act violates the single subject rule
when the General Assembly includes ... unrelated provisions that by no fair interpretation
have any legitimate relation to one another:'). Other opinions require only that all matters
included within the enactment "have a natural and logical connection" to a single subject-
the subject expressed in the title. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191. 199 (I11.
20011
HeinOnline  -- 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 137 2001
Harvard Journal on Legislation
law, which stated that in determining a single subject claim, a court had
to decide "whether all provisions of the bill fairly relate to the same sub-
ject, have a natural connection therewith or are incidents or means to ac-
complish its purpose." 301 Moreover, commentators have described the
single subject rule as requiring "unity" of subject matter.303 This descrip-
tion makes clear that the rule is addressed to the provisions of the bill,
not the title."" Put another way, "there must be some rational unity be-
tween the matters embraced in the act."305
This test's focus on the provisions of the bill has a long history. In
1870, the Missouri Supreme Court emphasized in State v. Millet006 that
the "character of the act was to be determined by its provisions, and not
by its title. ' 301 The Miller court was faithful to this test in resolving the
case before it, holding that "the provisions of the act treat of subjects
which have a natural connection. 30
If section 23 establishes two distinct requirements, 309 then the single
subject clause must have a meaning separate from that of the clear title
clause which follows it. That is, the single subject rule requires more
than that the subject of the bill be expressed in the title. Section 23 by its
terms speaks of the bill, not the title. The bill itself has a subject, and the
title is a shorthand way of describing that subject for easy reference.310 In
order to appreciate the complexity and scope of the subject, it is neces-
1999). These divergent standards were the subject of a heated argument between the ma-
jority and the dissent in the most recent Illinois case. Premier Prop. Mgmt. v. Chavez, 728
N.E.2d 476, 483 (111. 2000) (adopting Arangold rule); id. at 489 (Harrison, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Cervantes controls).
30 Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102 (quoting Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Co. v.
King, 664 S.W.2d 2, 6 (Mo. 1984)). Many states articulate the rule this way. See, e.g., Cer-
vantes, 723 N.E.2d at 267 ("natural and logical connection"); Associated Builders & Con-
tractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Minn. 2000) ("logically connected"); McIntire v.
Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 856 (Or. 1996) ("logical or natural connection").
3 See Ruud, supra note 7, at 390; IA SINGER, supra note 9, § 17.02, at 7,
3 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oregon recited a test emphasizing that "the provi-
sions of the law" must "relate directly or indirectly to the same subject." Mclntire v.
Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 854 (Or. 1996) (quoting State v. Shaw, 29 P. 1028, 1029 (Or. 1892)).
Applying this test, the Oregon court declared, requires that the court first "examine the
body of the act to determine whether (without regard to an examination of the title) [it] can
identify a unifying principle logically connecting all provisions in the act." Id. at 856.
3 Ruud, supra note 7, at 411 (quoting State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel, 180 N.E. 865,
868 (Ind. 1932)); see also In re Boot, 925 P.2d 964, 971 (Wash. 1996).
'0645 Mo. 495 (1870).
3See id. at 498 (citing People v. McCann, 16 N.Y. 58 (1857)).
3 Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
"I See, e.g., Carmack v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Agric., 945 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Mo. 1997)
(en banc); see also supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
310 Cf. 1A SINGER, supra note 9, § 18,07, at 47 ("[Wihen a statute is attacked because
of duality or plurality of subject matter, the attack is upon the body of the act, not simply
on the title:'); Mclntire v. Forbes, 909 P. 2d 846, 854 (Or. 1996) (stating that the "principal
purpose" for the single subject rule is to "guard against logrolling" in the "body of an
act"); id. at 857 (describing the function of the title to "identify and express a unifying
principle logically connecting all provisions in the Act").
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sary to read the provisions of the bill. Thus, proper analysis of a single
subject claim would follow Miller's test.
In its recent cases, the Missouri Supreme Court seems to have aban-
doned analysis of the bill's provisions in favor of over-reliance on the
title to determine whether or not the bill contains a single subject.3"
Hammerschmidt appears to be the source of the problem. The Hammer-
schmidt court "conclude[d]" that "[t]o the extent the bill's original pur-
pose is properly expressed in the title to the bill, we need not look be-
yond the title to determine the bill's subject"312 The court picked up this
theme in Carmack and subsequent cases. 3 3 Missouri Health Care Ass'n
flatly recites that "the test for whether a bill contains a single subject fo-
cuses on [its] title. '314 Fust states even more explicitly that "the single
subject test is not whether individual provisions of a bill relate to each
other.'3 5 Fust's statement exposes Hammerschmidt's error. Article III,
section 23 requires precisely that the bill contain a single subject. There
is simply no way to make that determination without comparing the bill's
provisions to each other.
In subsequent single subject cases, the court has struggled to apply
the Hammerschmidt test. In Corvera, for example, the court determined
the subject from the bill's title, "environmental control,' and found all of
the bill's provisions fairly related to that subject.316 The Corvera case
tests this Article's insistence that a bill's subject be measured by its pro-
visions. The bill finally passed was a combination of three separate
bills.317 Its provisions created the Emergency Response Commission-an
agency charged with responding to releases of hazardous substances,
regulating underground storage tanks, and regulating asbestos abatement
projects. 318 A reading of these provisions, particularly those relating to
underground storage tanks (a water pollution problem) and asbestos (an
311 The Illinois Supreme Court seems to have done likewise in its most recent single
subject case. See Premier Prop. Mgmt. v. Chavez, 728 N.E.2d 476, 483-84 (Ill. 2000). The
majority insists that the only requirement is that the provisions bear a relationship to a
single subject, apparently the one expressed in the title. Id. The dissent argues that the
provisions must relate to each other so as to form a single subject. Id. at 489-90 (Harrison
C.J., dissenting). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama relied on the title to decide a
single subject claim in Town of Brilliant %, City of Winfield, 752 So. 2d 1192, 1200 (Ala.
1999).
312 877 S.W.2d at 102 (citing no authority for this proposition). There is no require-
ment that the bill's original purpose be expressed in the title. This statement is an example
of the Missouri Supreme Court's failure to distinguish purpose from subject. But even if
this statement is understood to refer to the expression of the subject in the title, it departs
from precedents requiring analysis of the relationship among the bill's provisions.
313 According to Carmack, "Hamraerschmidt directs that we look first to the [bill's] ti-
tle to determine its subject" 945 SAV.2d at 959.
314 953 S.W.2d 617, 622 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
315 947 SAV.2d 424,428 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (emphasis added).
316 973 S.W.2d 851, 862 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
317 Id. at 860 (describing Missouri House Bills 77, 78, and 356, cited infra note 349).
318 Id.
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air pollution problem), suggests that they are distinct subjects. 19 Corvera
poses the question of the level of generality at which a subject can no
longer be considered "single." The issue is whether "pollution" is a sin-
gle subject, or whether "water pollution" and "air pollution" are two
separate subjects. If they are separate, they can still be harmonized, and
the legislature did so by writing the title broadly to encompass both as-
pects within "environmental control." But the fact that the legislature
harmonized the subjects under an umbrella title does not relieve the court
of responsibility for determining whether the bill's provisions in fact
concern a single subject.320
The single subject rule, as noted above, exists primarily to prevent
logrolling and to protect a governor's veto. One cannot be sure that the
bill at issue in Corvera is not an example of logrolling. It could well be
that neither the original bill "relating to ... underground storage tanks"32'
nor the original bill "for the purpose of regulating certain ... asbestos
abatement projects 322 appeared able to garner a majority to permit pas-
sage on its own, but by combining the minority committed to passage of
the one with the minority advancing the other, passage of both may have
been assured. If so, the combined bill embodies exactly the evil the sin-
gle subject rule exists to prevent, and should be held invalid. It may be,
however, that both bills could have passed separately but were combined
to make for more orderly, comprehensive legislation protecting the envi-
ronment. 323 Such legislation should be held valid. Missouri's lack of re-
corded legislative history makes it impossible to know what happened in
39 1 leave aside the question of the bill's creation of a commission to enforce provi-
sions of Missouri and federal law relating to hazardous substances. H.R. 77/78/356, 85th
Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § A (Mo. 1989). The court concluded that substantive provisions
and enforcement provisions together constitute a single subject under the "incidents or
means" portion of the single subject test. Corvera, 973 S.W.2d at 862.
32o Ironically, the court has implicitly recognized that it is necessary to examine a bill's
provisions to determine what the subject is, but it has usually done so in the context of
clear title challenges. In other words, the court examines the provisions in order to see
whether the title clearly expresses their content for purposes of determining the validity of
the title. See National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir., Dept. of Natural Res., 964 S.W.2d
818, 820 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (hypothesizing that the subject of the bill could be envi-
ronmental control); cf Mo. Health Care Ass'n, 953 S.W.2d at 623 n.2 (single subject case
hypothesizing that the subject of the bill could be long-term care if the title were revised
accordingly). A further irony is the court's admission in Missourians to Protect the Initia-
tive Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. 1990) (en banc), a case concerning the single-
subject rule for petitions proposing constitutional amendments, that "the Court must make
an independent examination of the proposed amendment to determine if there is a discern-
able single subject among its provisions" Id. at 832 (arising under Mo. CoNsT. Art. III,
§ 50).
32 H.R. 78, 85th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1988).
322 H.R. 77, 85th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1988).
123 Cf. IA SINGER, supra note 9, § 17.02, at 2 (asserting that the single subject rule
should not "cause the number of statutes required to effect a purpose to be needlessly mul-
tiplied").
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this case. Although the single subject rule ordinarily assumes that log-
rolling occurred, 324 one cannot say the Corvera decision is wrong.
The Missouri Supreme Court's misplaced emphasis on the title as
determinative of the subject, however, led to the wrong result in Dillon.
There, the bill's title, "relating to transportation'" never changed, even
though new provisions were added during the course of consideration."2
The court relied on this fact to hold that no single subject violation oc-
curred, even though the final version of the bill included provisions al-
lowing local governments to regulate billboards.: 6 The court appeared to
reason that because the title remained constant, it necessarily followed
that no new subjects were added to the bill.3 7 This is a non sequitur.
The Missouri Supreme Court's penchant for forcing the title to carry
the whole weight of the analysis flows from the tendency to assume that
all three constitutional limitations depend on the same rationale. It is true
that the original purpose and single subject requirements would operate
in a cumbersome manner at best without adequate bill titles. But the title
is only the means, not the end. The single subject rule assures legislators
and the governor that no extraneous (and unpalatable) matters have been
slipped into bills they otherwise support. This protection concerns the
provisions of the bill, not its title. That the title serves as a shorthand
mechanism for describing the subject of the bill is irrelevant in measur-
ing compliance with the single subject restriction.
Rules requiring unity of subject matter do not restrict the breadth of
an act.328 The legislature must be allowed to treat a problem in a compre-
hensive way rather than in separate components,3- but the subject may
not be so broad as to be meaningless.30 Going back to Cor'era, one may
wonder whether a subject like "environmental control" can truly be "sin-
gle:' A hypothetical bill on that subject could span hundreds of pages and
cover topics including agricultural runoff, underground storage tanks,
324 Ruud, supra note 7, at 399.
a 12 SAV.3d 322, 326-27 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
3Id. at 325.
3 Id.
29 See 1A SINGER, supra note 9, § 17.02, at 7; see also People v. Cervantes, 723
N.E.2d 265, 267 (IMI. 1999) (subject may be "as comprehensive as the legislature
chooses"); McIntire v. Forbes, 909 E2d 846, 856 (Or. 1996) ("legislature may choose a
comprehensive subject"); Jaksha v. State, 486 N.W.2d 858. 874 (Neb. 1992) (single subject
permissible "no matter how broad").
319 See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170. 1194 (Kan. 1994) (discuss-
ing comprehensive bill relating to public education); In re Boot, 925 P.2d 964. 971 (Wash.
1996) (discussing comprehensive bill relating to violence prevention).
3See State ex reL Ohio Acad. Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1100-01
(Ohio 1999) (hypothesizing that if stretched enough, the single subject rule would allow all
provisions to come in under one of only two subjects: civil law and criminal law). Simi-
larly, the dissenting judge in the most recent Illinois case disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that "property" constituted a single subject. Premier Prop. Mgmt. v. Chavez,
728 N.E.2d 476, 489 (nll. 2000) (Harrison, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that "a taxonomy so broad is useless").
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and sewage treatment (all related to water quality); automobile emis-
sions, factory emissions, and asbestos (all related to air quality); trans-
portation of hazardous wastes; disposal of medical wastes; protection of
endangered species; and numerous others. But as long as "there is no
blatant disunity among the provisions of a bill and there is a rational pur-
pose for their combination in a single enactment," the act is valid.33'
Because diverse matters may properly be combined in a single bill, it
is sometimes hard to judge whether a bill contains a single subject on the
basis of its contents alone. In cases like Corvera, it may be necessary to
refer to an external source. I turn now to the question of how to deter-
mine compliance.
2. Test for Compliance
If reference to an external source is necessary to determine whether
a statute contains a single subject, courts should look to the chapter
headings of the Missouri Revised Statutes. If a bill amends multiple
chapters, the court should presume that the bill contains multiple sub-
jects. This presumption, however, can be overcome by a showing that the
provisions fairly relate to the same subject or are means of accomplishing
the subject of the bill.
Hammerschmidt confused single subject analysis by using the
structure of the constitution, not the chapter headings of the statutes, as
the external source for determining unity of subject matter. After the
court determined the subject of the bill from its title, the opinion went on
to describe the process for determining the subject when the title is not
clear. In a footnote, the court mused about overly broad titles:
[W]here the challenge to a law is ... to the number of subjects
it contains and the bill's title fails to express the subject of the
bill with reasonable precision, we look to the Constitution as a
whole.... The organization of the constitution creates a pre-
sumption that matters relating to separate subjects therein
should ... not be commingled under unrelated headings. The
organizational headings of the constitution are strong evidence
of what those who drafted and adopted the constitution meant
by "one subject."332
This test, derived from Initiative Process, is a poor fit for statutes, how-
ever, for three primary reasons: the constitutional requirements for
amendments differ from those for laws, constitutional provisions are by
331 IA SINGER, supra note 9, § 17.02, at 7.
332 877 S.W.2d at 102 n.3 (emphasis added). The court derived this test from Missouri-
ans to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 831 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
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nature much broader than statutory provisions, and many statutes cover
topics not reflected in any constitutional heading.
First, the simple importation of the test for determining the subject
of a constitutional amendment into the line of cases involving statutes is
unsupported by the constitution's text. Though similar to the single sub-
ject provision of article I, section 23, the requirement for initiative pe-
titions differs in important respects.333
Second, constitutional provisions are by their very nature much
broader than statutory provisions. The text of a constitutional amendment
bears little resemblance to the text of an ordinary statute.3  A constitu-
tion is an organic document broadly delineating the rights of the people
and the powers of government. The Missouri Constitution contains only
twelve articles and within those articles just twenty-four subheadings. Its
provisions are typically general and brief. Statutes, on the other hand,
impose specific duties, establish procedures, define particular crimes and
set penalties, and regulate innumerable aspects of daily life. The Revised
Statutes of Missouri are divided into forty-one titles and currently in-
clude over 450 separately numbered chapters.335
These differences suggest that the Missouri Supreme Court took a
wrong turn in Hanmerschmidt by importing the single subject test from
Initiative Process to a case involving a run-of-the-mill statute. The notion
that what constitutes a single subject in a constitutional amendment is a
single subject in a bill is mistaken. 36 But this test does provide an anal-
n 3 Article III, section 50 provides in relevant part:
Petitions for constitutional amendments shall not contain more than one amended
and revised article of this constitution, or one new article which shall not contain
more than one subject and matters properly connected therewith.... Petitions for
laws shall contain not more than one subject which shall be expressed clearly in
the title. ...
Mo. CONsT. art. Il, § 50 (emphasis added). Section 50 repeats verbatim for laws the sub-
ject and title provisions of section 23. In other words, a statutory enactment must contain
only one subject whether it is passed by the legislature or adopted via the petition process.
For constitutional amendments, on the other hand, section 50 requires that petitions pertain
only to one amended article of the current constitution. This provision effectively confines
such petitions to one of the 12 broad subjects reflected in the current constitution. Secon-
darily, section 50 requires that any proposed new article contain only one subject. The
inclusion of this provision strengthens the argument that each of the constitution's existing
articles treats one broad subject.
3M4One need only recall the oft-repeated pronouncement of Chief Justice Marshall that
"it is a Constitution we are expounding" to appreciate the strength of this distinction in
American law. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). State consti-
tutions, however, are typically less broad and less static than the federal constitution.
3s See Mo. REv. STAT. Analytical Table of Chapters (1994). According to the preface.
titles are used for convenience only and are not part of the law. Mo. REv. STAT. vii (1994).
Chapters furnish the basis for citation of Missouri statutes. Id.
33 See Ruud, supra note 9, at 407-08 (describing efforts of two states to use constitu-
tional provisions as guides for single subject analysis and concluding that they were un-
sound except insofar as they made appropriations measures a subject unto themselves).
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ogy by which to devise a comparable test for statutes. For statutes, the
analogous subject index is the list of chapter headings of the revised stat-
utes. New legislation necessarily amends or adds to the compiled statutes
and must be fit into this subject structure. Reference to the structure of
the revised statutes affords an easier and more coherent basis for assess-
ing the subjects of bills.337
Third, Hammerschmidt's constitutional structure test is of limited
value because the subjects of many statutes simply are not reflected in
the articles and headings of the constitution.338 In such cases, the Ham-
merschmidt test provides no guidance. Stroh provides an example of such
a statute. All three bills involved in that case concerned intoxicating bev-
erages. 339 This subject simply does not appear in the structure of the con-
stitution.' All three bills did, however, purport to amend chapter 311 of
the Revised Statutes of Missouri, the liquor control law of the state.Y
Missouri Health Care Ass'n allows a comparison of the use of the
constitution and statutes as external sources for measuring compliance
with the single subject rule. The court accepted the bill's title, "relating
to the department of social services" ("DSS") as its subject, and then
checked the bill's provisions to see whether they were connected with
DSS .3 2 The opinion does not explicitly refer to the structure of the con-
stitution as a subject guide, but its holding implicitly follows this ap-
proach by focusing on which agency is charged with enforcing each of
the bill's provisions? 43 This Article's proposed test would reach the same
result. Provisions of the bill amending chapters 198 (nursing homes) and
660 (relating to DSS itself), though found in separate parts of the code,
all relate to the same subject-the regulation by DSS of care provided by
nursing homes. The provisions amending chapter 407 (merchandising
The dissenting judge in Initiative Process apparently believed the majority judged the
subject of the proposed constitutional amendment more strictly than it had judged statutes.
Initiative Process, 799 S.W.2d at 839 (Rendlen, J., dissenting). He commented that con-
stitutional provisions "are to be given a broader construction" than statutes. Id. (citing
Boone County Court v. State, 631 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)).
131 But see Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506, 509-10 (Ohio 1997) (Pfeifer, J., concur-
ring in part) (noting that the constitution does not require all provisions of a bill to affect
the same chapter of the Revised Code); Geja's Caf6 v. Metropolitan Pier and Exposition
Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1220 (Ill. 1992) (holding that the constitution does not prohibit
the amendment of an existing statute that contains multiple subjects).
338 Compare Mo. CoNsT. Contents (1945) with Mo. REV. STAT. Analytical Table of
Chapters (1994).339 See supra notes 211-222.
340 See Mo. CoNsT. Contents (1945).
34 H.R. 1470, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996); S. 814, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d
Sess. (Mo. 1996); S. 933, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996).
342 953 S.W.2d at 622.
3 The court found provisions concerning the trade practices of nursing homes-pro-
visions enforced by the attorney general, not DSS-to constitute a second subject. Id. at
623. Some of the state's executive agencies are defined not in the constitution, but in stat-
utes. Thus, reference to the constitution to see which agency enforces a particular provi-
sion often will be fruitless.
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practices), however, plainly constitute a second subject relating to trade,
not long-term care.
The Missouri Health Care Ass'n opinion raises an important ques-
tion about the reach of the Hammerschnidt test: whether all provisions
relating to any program administered by a single agency can constitute a
single subject. The constitutional structure test would hold that every-
thing that falls within article IV, section 37 of the Missouri Constitution,
defining "Social Services," constitutes a single subject. Recourse to the
structure of the Revised Statutes of Missouri would yield a different re-
sult. DSS has an exceptionally broad mandate, with responsibilities to-
ward children and their parents, the elderly, troubled youth, and the
poor.34 Its divisions include Aging, Child Support Enforcement, Family
Services, Medical Services, and Youth Services.-" These divisions ad-
minister diverse programs ranging from adoption to child abuse, nursing
homes, home energy assistance, and Medicaid. 6 These unrelated pro-
grams are found in chapters 453, 210, 198, 660, and 208 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri, respectively.3 7 Under the proposed test, the place-
ment of these matters in separate chapters would create a presumption
that they are separate subjects not to be contained in one bill. " The pro-
posed test comports with the ordinary understanding that child abuse and
nursing home care, for example, are separate subjects.
Corvera offers another opportunity to apply the proposed test.
There, the bill's provisions relating to asbestos projects amended chap-
ters 643 ("air conservation") and 701 ("state standards"), while those
relating to underground storage tanks were added to chapter 292.- 1 The
proposed test establishes a presumption that provisions amending differ-
ent chapters pertain to different subjects, not a single subject. The ulti-
mate question remains whether all the provisions are "fairly related" to
each other and thus constitute a single subject. Focusing on the fact that
all provisions of the bill regulate environmental hazards, the court found
344See Mo. REv. STAT. § 660.010 (1994) (establishing DSS); OFFICIAL MANUAL:
STATE OF MISSOURI 521 (1999) (describing DSS).
345 See OrFICIAL MANUAL, supra note 344, at 523-35.
3 See id.
347 Mo. REv. STAT. Analytical Table of Chapters at XI-XXVI.
3 The presumption, however, is secondary to the "fairly related" test. If the provisions
of the bill are "fairly related" to each other, then they constitute one subject regardless of
their codification into different chapters. Indeed, the "unquestioning use of the
classification of subjects in the law as a basis for determining compliance with the one-
subject rule is ... unsound." Ruud, supra note 7, at 411 (describing the use of various
elements of a state's jurisprudence--constitution, statutes, and common law-to determine
unity of subject). As Ruud points out, subjects are classified in the law for a variety of
reasons, many of which bear scant relation to the single subject rule. Id. (listing history.
legal theory, convenience, and functional relationships as common reasons for classifying
law in a particular manner). Resorting to the classification of subjects in the law can, how-
ever, serve as a "practical guide" to distinguish subjects "reasonably relat[edl" from those
combined for "tactical convenience only" Id.3
'9See H.R. 7778/356, 85th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1989).
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no single subject violation.350 In the end, the decision in Corvera rests on
the presumption that the statute is constitutional.35" ' This presumption
means that if alternative readings are possible, the court is bound to
adopt the constitutional one. 352 Though the title does not define the sub-
ject, the words selected by the legislature to describe the bill may be per-
suasive.353 Here, the legislature described the subject of the bill as "envi-
ronmental control," and the court determined that the term "environment"
includes a "complex" of factors relating to "climate, soil, and living
things."3" On that theory, the court correctly held that the bill contained a
single subject.
To sum up, the subject of a bill should be measured by the content of
its provisions. The provisions must relate to each other and together must
constitute a single subject. The title must express the subject, but the title
is not its test. When guidance is needed to determine whether a bill's
provisions in fact constitute a single subject, the court should resort to
the organization of the statutes themselves. This proposal is a limited
one, however. It establishes a presumption that matters within a single
chapter of the revised statutes constitute a single subject, and that matters
found in different chapters deal with separate subjects. The presumption
can be overcome, however, by demonstrating that the provisions them-
selves in fact "fairly relate" to the same subject or are "incidents" or
"means" of accomplishing it.
C. Clear Title
This Article has argued at length that the Missouri Supreme Court
relies too heavily on a bill's title to measure original purpose and single
subject violations. The ironic result in some of the clear title cases is that
the court sidesteps real analysis of the title. In Corvera, for example, the
court took up the clear title claim first."' It found that the title "relating
to environmental control" was capable of expressing a single subject.356 It
then concluded (without discussing the bill's provisions) that the title in
fact clearly expressed the content of the bill.357 Only then did the court
determine whether the bill contained a single subject.358 This is back-
3
-o Corvera, 973 S.W.2d at 862.
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 According to the Oregon Supreme Court, "if the court has not identified a unifying
principle logically connecting all provisions in the act," it should, as a second step, "ex-
amine the title of the act with reference to the body of the act ... to determine whether the
legislature ... has ... expressed in the title[ ] such a unifying principle ... " Mclntire v.
Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 856 (Or. 1996).
3-4 Corvera, 973 S.W.2d at 861 (discussing the title of the bill).
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wards. Article I, section 23 requires that the bill contain a single sub-
ject which (additionally) must be clearly expressed in its title.359 The sin-
gle subject analysis must come first.360 As the court stated in Solid Waste
Management, "[t]he mere fact that two subjects in a bill can be recon-
ciled as part of a broader subject, and thus satisfy... (the] single subject
[rule], does not, in itself, mean that the broader subject has been clearly
expressed in the title" '361 This section considers the analysis of clear title
claims.
The clear title rule exists primarily to ensure that the public has
"sufficient notice of the contents of the act."' 3- Logically, a bill's title
may violate the rule in two ways.30 First, it can be worded so broadly as
to provide no meaningful notice of the bill's contents. Second, the title's
wording can be so specific as to fail to express the totality of the bill's
subject matter. Clear title problems usually fall into one of these two
categories. Among the ten recent Missouri cases, there is one of each
type: St. Louis Health Care Network involved an overly broad title, while
Solid Waste Management involved an under-inclusive title. Together,
these two cases set the outer limits of clear title analysis under Missouri
law.
1. Breadth of Title
In 1998, the court decided St. Louis Health Care Network and Solid
Waste Management. St. Louis Health Care Network involved a bill whose
title said it "relat[ed] to certain incorporated and non-incorporated enti-
ties"'364 Commenting that the phrase "incorporated and non-incorporated
entities" "could define most, if not all, legislation passed by the General
Assembly,' '36s the court ruled the title "far too broad" to express any sin-
gle subject.3" The court observed that "it is difficult to imagine a broader
phrase that could be employed in the title of legislation: '317 In this rare
situation, the court need not determine the subject of the bill. No matter
what the subject of the bill's provisions turns out to be, this title cannot
adequately express that subject.m This case establishes that overly broad
359 Mo. CONST. art. Im, § 23.
360 One exception is discussed, infra notes 365-368 and accompanying text.
361964 S.W.2d at 821; see also Mo. Health Care Ass'n, 953 S.W.2d at 623 n.2.
Corvera, 973 S.W.2d at 862; see also IA SINGER, supra note 9, § 18.0(, at 27; su-
pra notes 107-118.
363 Cf. 1A SINGER, supra note 9, § 18.08, at 54-55 (discussing severability of provi-
sions in bills).
3&968 S.W.2d at 146.
36Id. at 148 (noting that the phrase encompasses "businesses, charities, civic organi-
zations, governments, and government agencies").36 Id.367 Id. at 147.
368 The bill bearing this broad title covered matters ranging from venue to same-sex
marriage, confirming that the bill did not contain a single subject. Id. at 146.
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titles are facially invalid; reference to the contents of the bill is not necessary
to the analysis in such cases, and such reference cannot save the statute.
Solid Waste Management concerns the opposite problem-a title that
is narrower than the bill itself. 69 The bill's title, "relating to solid waste
management," provided no notice that some of the bill's provisions re-
lated to hazardous waste management as well.3 70 The fact that solid waste
management and hazardous waste management could be understood as
parts of a single subject was irrelevant because the title, as written, did
not express the broader subject; it expressed only a portion of it.371 Solid
Waste Management establishes that a bill title that "descends to particu-
lars and details" is "affirmatively misleading" if it fails to mention all
aspects covered by the bill.372 Thus, an "under-inclusive" title violates the
clear title requirement.373 Resolution of this type of clear title claim re-
quires reference to "some source extrinsic to the title itself,"374 namely, to
the contents of the bill. A bill's title, whether broad or narrow, must
above all be "accurate" and "clear. 375
The most recent Missouri case, Dillon, marked a step back from the
progress made in Solid Waste Management and St. Louis Health Care
Network. The bill title referred only to "transportation," but the bill in-
cluded provisions allowing cities and counties to regulate billboards. 76
The Dillon court recognized that the bill title at issue was, if anything,
under-inclusive. 37 7 Additionally, in finding provisions regulating bill-
boards to be clearly expressed in the bill title "transportation," the court
reiterated its original purpose analysis, which assumed that the federal
highway funding requirement that states regulate billboards establishes a
connection between billboards and transportation. 378 The court, therefore,
found no violation of the clear title requirement.3 79
An Iowa Case, State v. Taylor,38 provides a comparison. The bill at
issue in that case contained seventy-four sections calling for, among
other things, training for gang-affected youth; restricting access by juve-
niles to drugs, tobacco, and alcohol; establishing community programs
for at-risk juveniles; combatting child abuse; creating weapon-free
school zones; and appropriating funds for juvenile programs and serv-
36See 964 S.W.2d at 821-22.
370 Id. at 820.
371 Id. at 821-22; see also Mo. Health Care Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 953 S.W.2d 617,
623 n.2 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
372 964 S.W.2d at 821.
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 821.
376 Dillon, 12 S.W.3d at 324.
377 Id. at 329. The court seemed to turn the underinclusivity analysis upside down
when it concluded that "billboard regulation is not underinclusive of transportation." Id.
378 Id. at 327-28 (original purpose); id. at 329 (clear title).
379 Id. at 328-29.
310 557 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1996).
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ices. 81 It also criminalized the act of trafficking in stolen weapons by an
adult, "without reference to juvenile justice concems: '  The bill's title
described it as "relating to juvenile justice.'3 s- The Iowa Supreme Court
found the title deficient because it failed "to indicate that the legislation
addresses a weapons law which bears no specific relationship to juve-
niles?' 3m Here, the title was broad and properly encompassed a wide vari-
ety of initiatives relating to juveniles. The title suggested, however, that
the legislation applied only to offenses relating to juvenile delinquency,' x
and hence was under-inclusive. The title gave no notice that the bill in-
cluded an adult weapons offense. Focusing on the notice function of bill
titles, the Iowa court commented that as the legislation becomes broader
in scope, "the legislature's obligation to provide greater specificity in the
act's title necessarily increases "'3
2. Test for Compliance
In Missouri, as in other states, the test for compliance with the clear
title rule focuses on whether the title actually provided notice of the
contents of the bill. The title must "indicate in a general way the kind of
legislation that was being enacted.'' 38 The title need not give specific de-
tails of the bill's contents,3"' nor be the best possible title., Because the
main rationale behind the clear title rule is providing notice to the pub-
lic,390 the test for compliance should focus on the likely understanding of
the average person.39' The title must call attention to the subject matter of
the bil3u2 in such a way as to provoke a reading of the bill 93 or lead to an
-18 Id. at 526.
3M Id.
mId. at 527.3M Id.
3 Id.
3Id. at 527.
37 Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir., Dep't of Natural Res., 964 S.WV.2d 818, 821
(Mo. 1998) (en banc) (quoting Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424,429 (Mo. 1997) (en
banc)); see also Lutz v. Foran, 427 S.E.2d 248, 251 (Ga. 1993).
3" St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Mo. 1998) (en bancd;
see also Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 570 N.V.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 1997) (hold-
ing that the title need not be an index of the bill); Louviere v. Mobile City Bd. of Educ.,
670 So. 2d 873, 876 (Ala. 1995) (same); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288. 306 (N.M. 1995)
(same).
3 Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.V.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 2000)
("We held 'it is not essential that the best or even an accurate title be employed, if it be
suggestive in any sense of the legislative purpose:") (citations omitted).
390 See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
311 See, e.g., McGlothren v. E. Shore Family Practice, 742 So. 2d 173, 177 (Ala. 1999)
(holding that the test is whether the "average legislator or person" would be informed of
the purpose of the enactment); Patrice v. Murphy, 966 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Wash. 1998) (ex-
plaining that the clear title rule requires notice to the general public).
39 Jaksha v. State, 486 N.W.2d 858, 874 (Neb. 1992).
393 McCoy v. Vankirk, 500 S.E.2d 534, 546 (%V. Va. 1997).
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inquiry into the body of the act.394 The title should not force the reader to
"search out the commonality" of subjects contained in the bill but not
mentioned in the title.395
Accordingly, analysis of the sufficiency of the title ordinarily re-
quires a comparison with the provisions of the bill. Some states have ar-
ticulated a requirement that the act conform to the title.396 Because the
constitutional provisions require the title to express the subject of the
bill, however, it seems more helpful to phrase the test the other way
around: the title must conform to the bill. 397
The Missouri Supreme Court's analysis of the title in Dillon paid in-
sufficient attention to the contents of the bill in question. As finally
passed, the bill was about two subjects: the state transportation bureauc-
racy and local regulation of billboards. The bill's title, "relating to trans-
portation," was actually far broader than the provisions of the bill itself,
which concerned mainly positions, salaries, and the organizational
structure of the Department of Transportation and related commissions.
The subject of this bill was not really "transportation" but rather em-
ployment matters within the transportation department. The title in Dil-
lon was also under-inclusive as related to the billboard provisions in the
bill as enacted. The court attempted to address this problem by imagining
a relationship between transportation and billboards,398 but the fact that
such a relationship may exist is irrelevant to article III, section 23, which
requires that the title actually reflect the contents of the bill, not merely
that some relationship between the title and bill could theoretically ex-
ist.319 The title in Dillon gave no notice of the bill's actual contents and
was therefore misleading, and should have been held invalid under the
rationale of Solid Waste Management.
The dissenting opinion in Solid Waste Management created confu-
sion about the test for compliance with the clear title rule by conflating it
with the compliance test for the single subject rule. In Solid Waste Man-
3941n re Boot, 925 P.2d 964, 971 (Wash. 1996).
395 Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir., Dep't of Natural Res., 964 S.W.2d 818, 821
(Mo. 1998) (en banc).
396 See, e.g., id.; Tenn. Mun. League v. Thompson, 958 S.W.2d 333, 336-37 (Tenn.
1997).
397 See Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 306 (N.M. 1995) (finding the title "sufficiently
related to the contents of the bill to pass muster"). The fact that the title may be changed to
reflect amendments to the bill during the course of its consideration supports this under-
standing. See Solid Waste Mgmt., 964 S.W.2d at 821 (noting consistent approval of title
amendments during bill consideration).
398 See Dillon, 12 S.W.3d at 327-29. The court relied on the connection between fed-
eral highway funding and state regulation of billboards to save this bill. Id. That there may
be such a connection in other contexts does not mean that this bill's title accurately ex-
pressed the content of its provisions. Interestingly, Judge Price offered a similar theory in
Solid Waste Management, turning to federal environmental law to "demonstrate[ I the close
relationship between hazardous and solid waste." 964 S.W.2d at 824 (Price, J., dissenting).
199 Cf. Mclntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 856 (Or. 1996) (requiring, in the context of
single subject analysis, that the title be examined "with reference to the body of the act").
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agement, the majority and dissenting opinions disagreed about the
meaning of the words "relating to" as used in most bill titles in Mis-
souri.4w The dissent argued that use of the words "relating to" in the title
of a bill incorporates within the title's ambit anything "relating to" the
subject actually expressed therein,4D' but this standard is actually the sin-
gle subject test: to determine the bill's subject from its provisions, one
examines the provisions to see whether their topics are so related or con-
nected as to form a single subject. The test for titles is whether they
clearly express the subject, not the subject plus other matters related to it.
The subject has already been defined, and there is no need to consider
additional matters that may somehow be "related" to it. In fact, to do so
contravenes the purpose of the clear title rule, which is to provide accu-
rate notice of the bill's contents.
Overly broad and under-inclusive titles violate the clear title re-
quirement. To be valid, the title must clearly express the bill's actual
subject. Thus, analysis of the title ordinarily must examine the bill's pro-
visions, not proceed only in the abstract. A bill whose title fails to pro-
vide meaningful notice of the bill's contents is unconstitutional.
IV. RELEVANT VERSION OF BILL
In two recent opinions, the Missouri Supreme Court laid down rules
concerning the version of the bill to be examined in determining whether
the original purpose, single subject, and clear title rules have been vio-
lated. In Stroh, the court stated that the "original purpose of a bill must
... be measured at the time of the bill's introduction: "  Later in the
same opinion, the court added that the "determination of whether a bill
violates the.., single subject requirement is made concerning the bill as
it is finally passed."' 3 Most recently, in Dillon, the court addressed clear
title cases, stating that that "rule necessarily applies to the version of the
bill that passed, not the introduced version" ' 01 The court's statements
were unaccompanied by any explication of the rules or by citation to
prior authority. As a result, these new rules leave open several questions.
With respect to original purpose, the court recognized the obvious
point that it is not sufficient to measure original purpose violations
against the final version alone. The court stated that original purpose
must be measured at the time of the bill's introduction.4- But because the
-o Compare Solid Waste Mgmt., 964 S.V.2d at 822 with id. at 823 (Price, J., dissent-
ing).
40' Id. at 823 (describing "relating to" as a phrase of "connection, not restriction").
- 954 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Mo. 1997) (en bane).
403Id. at 327.
- 12 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
40 Stroh, 954 S.W.2d at 326.
46 Id.
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notion of a change in purpose is inherently comparative, the court must
also read the provisions of the final version and determine whether the
bill's purpose changed during its consideration.401 Because the original
purpose rule protects the integrity of the legislative process, its test for
compliance must focus on developments throughout the process of con-
sideration."° If only the end result were examined, changes that occurred
during the process, in violation of section 21, would never be detected. 409
The proper time for determining compliance with the single subject
rule is a harder question. As noted, the court in Stroh declared that single
subject violations are measured against the version of the bill finally
passed.410 At first blush, this rule seems doubtful-after all, the single
subject rule refers to "a bill," not "an Act." '' But the primary rationale
for the single subject rule is to safeguard the moment of decision at the
end of the process-the vote of legislators or the signature of the gover-
nor. Thus, measuring compliance with the single subject rule by refer-
ence to the version of the bill presented for decision is correct.
Clear title claims present the hardest question. According to Dillon,
the title that counts is the one attached to the bill as finally passed. 2  The
leading treatise comments:
[I]t would violate the letter and spirit of the constitutional safe-
guard against stealthy legislation to hold that the subject of a
bill must be clearly expressed in its title during the progress of
the measure through the legislature, but that any misleading or
delusive title may be attached to it when it is presented to the
governor for approval.41 3
The earlier St. Louis Health Care Network case in effect applied this rule,
though without comment.4 4 Reflection on the purposes served by the
clear title rule, however, suggests that the court takes too limited a view
of the relevant time. The same concern for accuracy of the title at the last
stage of the legislative process-when the bill is presented to the gover-
nor-should prevail at all earlier stages of the bill's consideration. If the
4 The Stroh court in fact compares Missouri Senate Bill 933, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d
Sess. (Mo. 1996), as introduced, with Missouri House Bill 933, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess.
(Mo. 1996), as finally passed. 954 S.W.2d at 326.
4m The court recognizes as much in Akin by indicating that the bill's original purpose
remained the same "throughout the legislative process." 934 S.W.2d 295, 302 (Mo. 1996)
(en banc).
401 See Williams, supra note 1, at 799.410 See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
4 11 Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 23.
412 See Dillon, 12 S.W.3d at 329.
4'3 IA SINGER, supra note 9, § 18.01, at 25 (quoting Weis v. Ashley, 81 N.W. 318
(Neb. 1899)).
414 See St. Louis Healthcare Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Mo. 1998) (en
banc).
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purpose of the clear title rule is primarily to provide notice to the public
throughout the legislative process and to provide an opportunity to com-
ment on pending legislation, then the title must be clear at every stage. It
is not sufficient for the title to express the bill's subject clearly only at
the end of the process, when the time to comment has passed. Moreover,
article III, section 23 speaks of "bills," not of "acts:' It provides that "no
bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed
in its title. '415 Literally, every bill's subject shall be clearly expressed in
its title. So read, the provision covers introduced bills, amended bills,
substitute bills, and bills finally passed. The clear title limitation applies
at every stage of the legislative process, from introduction through sig-
nature into law.
That bills' titles are commonly rewritten while the legislation is
under consideration also supports the argument that the title must be
clear at every stage. The Missouri Supreme Court recently remarked that
changing the bill's title as the bill is amended during the course of con-
sideration "is not a novel proposition' 4 6 It is a "process that the legisla-
ture has routinely used" and one the court "has consistently approved", 7
In Corvera, for example, each of the bills as introduced bore a title accu-
rately expressing the particular aspect of the environment it purported to
control,418 and the combined bill's title was rewritten to conform to the
broader scope of the substitute bill.419 In Solid Waste Management, by
contrast, the original title remained the same even after the bill was
amended, and resulted in a clear title violation.420 The bill bore the title
"relating to solid waste" throughout the process, even after the bill was
amended at the very end of the legislative session to apply to hazardous
waste. 41 Thus, during most of the time when members of the public
might have been expected to monitor the legislation and comment on it,
the title gave adequate notice of the bill's contents. The fact that the title
became unclear only at the very last minute did not dissuade the court
from finding a clear title violation. Similarly, in St. Louis Health Care
Network the title was accurate at the start but was changed when the bill
was amended, and in such a way as to "obscure" the contents of the
amended bill.42 Together, these cases suggest that as long as there is still
time to learn of the bill and comment on it, the constitution requires a
title that fairly apprises the public of the actual subject of the pending
415 Mo. CONST. art. II, § 23 (emphasis added).
416 Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir., Dep't of Natural Res., 964 S.W.2d 818. 821
(Mo. 1998) (en banc).
417 Id.
418 973 S.W.2d 851, 860 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (describing bills "for the purpose of
regulating certain asbestos abatement projects"; "relating to ... underground storage
tanks"; and "relating to water well drillers").419 Id. (describing a bill "relating to environmental control").
420 964 S.W.2d at 819.
4211M at 820.
42See St. Louis Health Care NeAvork, 968 S.W2d at 149.
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legislation. A contrary holding would permit one of the evils the clear
title rule aims to prevent: "surreptitious[ ] insert[ion] of related amend-
ments into the body of a pending bill."4 When a case arises in which a
title that was defective during a substantial part of the process is revised
to become clear only at the very end, the court should reconsider its po-
sition in Dillon that only the final title matters. 424
V. REMEDY
In some states, the constitutional provisions themselves provide a
remedy for violation of the relevant procedural restriction, answering the
question whether a violation necessarily invalidates the entire enact-
ment.425 For example, Iowa's single subject and clear title rule provides
that "if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be ex-
pressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as
shall not be expressed in the title. 426 The Oregon provision is identical. 427
The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted that state's constitution
to provide that "if only one subject is embraced in the title, then any
subject not expressed in the title ... may be rejected, and the part that is
expressed in the title be allowed to stand. '428
By contrast, in Missouri and many other states, neither the constitu-
tion nor its interpretation by the courts sets forth an across-the-board rule
as to the effect of an original purpose, single subject, or clear title viola-
tion. As a result, the proper remedy for such a violation remains uncer-
tain, and courts have come to a variety of conclusions about the answer.
As noted above, the Illinois Supreme Court's invalidation of the entire
Safe Neighborhoods Law sparked a furious response, particularly be-
cause the court refused to consider severance, even on rehearing. 429 This
response indicates that courts must consider severance in arriving at a
proper balance between enforcing the constitutional restrictions and un-
duly hampering the legislature's ability to act.
Few of the ten recent Missouri cases discuss the specific remedy for
a constitutional procedural violation. In some, no violation was found,
while in others the statute as a whole was held unconstitutionalY.4 0 Ham-
merschmidt, however, embarked on a discussion of remedies, specifically
413 Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Mo. 1994).
424 See Dillon, 12 S.W.3d at 329.
415 See 2 SINGER, supra note 9, § 44.12, at 534.426 IowA CONST. art. III, § 29.427 OR. CONST. art. IV, § 20.
42SPatrice v. Murphy, 966 P.2d 1271, 1276 (Wash. 1998) (quoting Power v. Huntley,
235 P.2d 173 (Wash. 1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
429 See Chambers, supra note 47, at 2 (noting that the court "turned down a suggestion
that it should sever the law's [invalid] provisions").
430 See Appendix II.
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addressing the severance of unconstitutional provisions4 31 Hammer-
schmidt recognized that the court must reconcile conflicting mandates in
deciding what remedy is appropriate when one of the constitutional
limitations on legislative procedure is violated. '32 On one hand, courts
"bear[ ] an obligation to sever unconstitutional provisions of a statute"
when they can do so without rendering the remainder meaningless.4 " On
the other hand, the court implies that when "the procedure by which the
legislature enacted a bill violates the Constitution" the entire enactment
may be tainted!3M If so, severance may be improper.
A threshold question, then, is whether original purpose, single sub-
ject, and clear title violations necessarily taint the entire bill, so that no
valid provisions remain.435 This Part explores that question and concludes
that, at least in some situations, these violations invalidate only a portion
of the enactment. Even so, applying severance in these cases is often
difficult.
A. Severance Analysis
Severance analysis requires two steps. First, the legislature must
have intended that the provisions of the act be severable.47 Missouri's
severance statute,437 like those of many states, expresses that intent with
respect to all statutes, though one commentator suggests that such blan-
ket severability provisions "are treated only as aids to interpretation and
not as commands."438 Second, the provisions must be capable of sever-
ance.439 Generally, this means that "the valid portion of an enactment
must be independent of the invalid portion and must form a complete act
within itself " '4 Missouri's statute requires severance unless "the valid
provisions of the statute are ... dependent upon the void provision ... or
unless ... the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete ... :,,
Independence depends on whether "the legislature would have enacted
the valid provisions without the void one.''1 2 Completeness requires that
the "valid provisions, standing alone, are [ ]complete and [ ]capable of
431877 S.W.2d 98, 103-04 (Mo. 1994).
432 Id. at 103.
433 Id. (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.140 (1986)).
434Id. (stating that severance is a "more difficult issue" when the process of enactment
was flawed).
45 Cf. id. (finding that where "the procedure by which the legislature enacted a bill
violates the Constitution, ... the entire bill is unconstitutional unless the Court is con-
vinced beyond reasonable doubt" that one subject is controlling).
436 2 SINGER, supra note 9, § 44.03, at 495.4 7Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.140 (1969).
439 2 SINGER, supra note 9, § 44.11, at 53 1.439 Id. § 44.03, at 495.
440 Id. § 44.04, at 501 (footnote omitted).
44 Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.140 (1969).442 Id.
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being executed in accordance with the legislative intent." 43 Both steps of
the analysis boil down to legislative intent, a problematic concept in the
context of procedural violations.
B. Application of Severance to Procedural Violations
The Missouri Supreme Court appears to accept severance as a rem-
edy for constitutional procedural violations. While the court has not re-
cently invalidated any provision on original purpose grounds, its deci-
sions in Hammerschmidt and Carmack severed the provisions found to
violate the single subject rule from an otherwise complete, coherent, and
valid bill.' One of the court's clear title violation cases applies sever-
ance;"5 the other does not.446 In these decisions, the court appears to bal-
ance severance against invalidation of the whole statute in the abstract,
instead of discussing remedies in connection with the specific violation
found to have occurred. As a result, the court's analysis of remedies is
incomplete. Further analysis is required in order to determine whether
the same rules actually govern severance in all procedural violation
cases.
Solid Waste Management complicated the remedy question by over-
looking the requirement that the void provisions be capable of severance.
There, the bill's title and most of its provisions related to solid waste, but
one provision also encompassed hazardous waste." 7 The Missouri Su-
preme Court recited its duty to sever the offending provisions, but found
it impossible to do so given the wording of the enactment." 8 Instead, the
court "restrict[ed] the application of the statute" to the valid portion-
solid waste." 9 As the court admitted, this amounts to rewriting the




4"Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 104 (severing provisions concerning county gov-
ernance from a bill concerning election procedures); Carmack v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Agric.,
945 S.W.2d 956, 961 (Mo. 1997) (severing provisions concerning diseased livestock from a
bill relating to economic development).
441 Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 964 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Mo. 1998)
(en banc).
446 St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145, 145 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
447 Solid Waste Mgmt., 964 S.W.2d at 819-20.
4 Id. at 822. According to the court, section 260.003 of the Missouri Revised Statutes
"refers to a 'permit, license, or grant of authority [ ] issued or renewed ... pursuant to this
chapter.' The court observed that the statute's reference to "this chapter," chapter 260,
"encompasses the separate regulatory schemes for both solid waste management and haz-
ardous waste management." Id.
4491d. (citing Associated Indus. v. Dir. of Revenue, 918 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo. 1996)
(en banc)).
450 Id.
451 See Associated Indus. v. Dir of Revenue, 918 S.W.2d at 785; 2 SiNoEat, supra note
9, § 44.14, at 541 (describing the "reluctance to engage in judicial legislation").
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This ruling also contradicted one of the very cases relied upon for
support, Associated Industries of Missouri vt Director of Revenue 52 In
Associated Industries, the United States Supreme Court had found that a
Missouri statute violated the Commerce Clause in certain situations;4 3 on
remand, the Missouri Supreme Court decided the statute was "completely
invalid" and struck it down "in toto "'4- The court concluded that sever-
ance was not an option because Missouri's severance statute "does not
address the 'as applied"' situation.455 It also specified that the court
"ha[d] no power to rewrite the statute" so the only remedy was to "strike
it down in its entirety."4 6 Yet in Solid Waste Management, the court
justified severance in just such a situation by reference to Associated In-
dustries.
The standard test for resolving severance issues, and the focus of As-
sociated Industries, is legislative intent.4 7 This test raises thorny ques-
tions in the context of procedural violations. First, the intent test prom-
ises to be difficult to apply in the absence of substantive legislative his-
tory. In Associated Industries itself, the court examined the history of the
enactment of a provision similar in its terms to the one that severance by
application would have created.458 That earlier enactment was "never im-
plemented" and was "ultimately repealed" and replaced with the enact-
ment invalidated by the United States Supreme Court. 59 With this infor-
mation in hand, the Missouri Supreme Court was on firm ground in infer-
ring that the legislature did not intend severance. In the case of most stat-
utes, however, there is no such history. Nor is it likely that other sources
exist from which to obtain the information the severance test requires.
The intent test forces many courts considering severance to turn to
speculation.
More importantly, the question of legislative intent plays out differ-
ently in cases of the procedural violations. Associated Industries involved
a statute that, as to some applications of its terms, exceeded the legisla-
ture's taxing power.461 The text of the enactment at issue suggested that
45 918 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
45 Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 643 (1994).4
-1 Associated Indus. v. Dir of Revenue, 918 S.W.2d at 781.
4
-I Id. at 784.
456 Id. at 785.
45 See 2 SINGER, supra note 9, § 44.03, at 495; Associated Idus. r. Dir of Revenue.
918 S.W.2d at 784.458 See id. at 784-85.
49 Id. at 785.
46 Cf. id. at 785 (refusing "to speculate that the General Assembly would have ap-
proved the statute as now limited").
4' The legislature enacted a use tax that violated the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 643 (1994). That
is, the General Assembly enacted a statute that exceeded its substantive power to tax under
article X of the Missouri Constitution (taxation) and the Tenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution (reserving to the states powers not delegated to the United States).
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the Missouri General Assembly was aware of constitutional limitations
on its taxing power and intended to act up to the limits of that power. 62
The Missouri court concluded that the legislature would not have enacted
the "patchwork" tax scheme that was left after the limits of the state's
taxing power were determined.
463
In the context of the Missouri constitution's procedural limitations,
however, the question is not the extent of the legislature's substantive
power."64 Under article III, sections 21 and 23, the legislature has no
power to enact any bill in contravention of the procedural limitations.
These provisions, by their terms, contemplate no range of authority. To
illustrate, the legislature has the substantive power to tax so long as it
does not contravene provisions of the state or federal constitutions. But it
cannot enact a tax, even if substantively permissible, by means of a bill
"amended ... so as to change its original purpose' 465 or "contain[ing]
more than one subject,"46 or failing to "clearly express[ ]" that subject in
its title.467 Legislative intent to enact a bill violating one or more of these
restrictions is irrelevant. The prohibitions exist precisely to eliminate
legislation by means the people find odious. In Missouri Health Care
Ass'n, for example, the legislature may well have intended to enact a sin-
gle bill regulating care in nursing homes and also regulating representa-
tions nursing homes make in advertising. In fact, passage of the two
measures may have been feasible only in combination.4 68 If so, the bill
represented a classic case of logrolling, and violated the single subject
rule. Legislative intent to combine two separate subjects cannot be used
to defeat the constitutional prohibition. And if passage of the two meas-
ures depended on their combination, it would be deceptive to maintain
that the legislature intended to pass one without the other.
462 Associated Indus. v. Dir of Revenue, 918 S.W.2d at 785 (noting that "the legislature
contemplated in general that there would be constitutional exceptions" to the tax it en-
acted).
463 Id.
44 See Ruud, supra note 7, at 399 ("[T]he one-subject rule is not concerned with sub-
stantive legislative power.").
4 5 Mo. CONST. art. III, § 21.
-Id. § 23.
467 Id.
46 As the court noted, the two subjects could have theoretically been reconciled as
parts of the larger subject of "long-term care:' but the legislature failed to do so, referring
in the bill's title only to the provisions relating to standards of care (enforced by the De-
partment of Social Services) and not to advertising. Mo. Health Care Ass'n v. Attorney
Gen., 953 S.W.2d 617, 623 n.2 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). This example highlights the
difficulty of distinguishing cases of comprehensive legislation on a broad topic (valid)
from cases of logrolling (invalid). This difficulty leads courts to "assume" that logrolling is
behind any enactment involving multiple subjects, without inquiring into the specific facts.
Ruud, supra note 7, at 399.
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C. Linking Remedy to Rationale
Constitutional restrictions on legislative procedure in most states are
"mandatory," not merely "directory,' and hence are judicially enforce-
able.469 The court in State v. Miller470 stated:
[W]e consider [the single subject and clear title provision]
equally obligatory and mandatory with any other provision in
the constitution; and where a law is clearly and palpably in op-
position to it, there is no alternative but to pronounce it inva-
lid 7'
As constitutional prohibitions, these rules take priority over the general
severance statute or specific severability provisions.47 Consequently, the
courts are duty-bound to enforce these rules in cases where the legisla-
ture has been found to violate them.
The question of the specific remedy by which such enforcement oc-
curs, however, runs headlong into judicial reluctance to trample on leg-
islative prerogative. This reluctance finds expression in the "cardinal
principle" that courts are "to save and not to destroy" legislation." The
severance remedy generally tries to balance courts' duty to enforce con-
stitutional requirements against the mandate to uphold legislation wher-
ever possible. In the context of procedural violations, the legislative in-
tent test requires some refinement. In these cases, the court should link
its analysis of remedies to the particular procedural violation found. In
doing so it must take account of the rationales behind the procedural
limitations.474 If the purposes of the prohibition are fulfilled in the par-
ticular case, the act should be held valid.475 If not, severance should be
ordered only when the enactment does not embody the evil the proce-
dural restriction was designed to prevent. Enforcement of constitutional
procedural limitations in some cases requires complete invalidation of
the enactment. The remedy for each violation is discussed below.
40 See Ruud, supra note 7, at 393 (stating that only Ohio holds the single subject rule
to be directory). Mclntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846 (Or. 1996). raised the question whether
the Oregon courts were authorized to review legislative acts for compliance with constitu-
tional procedural rules. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that such rules are judicially
enforceable. Id. at 853.
47 45 Mo. 495 (1970).
471 Id. at 498 (discussing Mo. CON T. art. IV, § 32, the forerunner of art. Ill. § 23).
472See State ex reL Normandy Sch. Dist. v. Small, 356 S.V.2d 864. 879 (Mo. 1962)
(en banc) (Storckman, J., dissenting).
47 2 SInGER, supra note 9, § 44.09, at 526 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971)).
474 Ruud, supra note 7, at 402.475 Id.
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1. Original Purpose
The Missouri Supreme Court's reluctance to sustain original purpose
challenges (and the dearth of such cases in other states) may moot any
discussion of the remedy for such a violation. But because this Article
argues that the court should modify its overly deferential posture towards
this claim, it offers a few comments on the appropriate remedy.
This Article posits that the rationale behind the original purpose rule
is to facilitate an orderly legislative process. 76 The rule allows legislators
to monitor the large volume of legislative proposals by title, assuring
them that drastic changes in the bills' objectives have not been made. The
original purpose rule also serves to enforce the constitutional deadline
for introduction of new measures. This rule ensures adequate time for the
consideration of each measure, whether introduced as a new bill or as an
amendment to a bill already pending. These rationales reflect a concern
with the entire legislative process from beginning to end.
The original purpose rule prohibits any change in purpose. This is a
unitary concept: either the purpose changed or it did not. When a bill's
purpose changes midstream, the whole bill is tainted. In such a case, sev-
erance is improper. Furthermore, severance analysis requires a determi-
nation that the valid provisions are independent of the void ones. A true
change in the bill's purpose affects the entire bill, so it is hard to see how
any portion of it could be considered independent of the rest. When a bill
has been transformed during the course of its consideration, it is utterly
impossible to say what portion of some earlier version the legislature
would have intended to pass. Severance analysis simply does not fit this
claim.
2. Single Subject
Unlike the unitary concept of original purpose, the prohibition on
multiple subjects lends itself to severance analysis. A court reviewing a
bill containing multiple subjects can theoretically isolate distinct subjects
and perhaps determine which of them is the primary one, as Hammer-
schmidt directs. 77 If the portion of the bill relating to the primary subject
can stand on its own as a complete enactment, and if the legislature
would have passed that portion independently of the rest, then that por-
tion should be preserved. Only the portions relating to additional subjects
would be severed. 7 This analysis, however, may discount the possibility
that logrolling was involved.
476 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
477 See Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 103.
471 But see Ruud, supra note 7, at 399-400 (suggesting that the inclusion of multiple
subjects renders the entire act "suspect" and therefore, makes the use of severance "mani-
festly unsound"); State ex reL Normandy School Dist. of St. Louis County v. Small, 356
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The Missouri Supreme Court seems to treat multiple subjects as in-
herently independent for purposes of the remedy. In Hammerschmidt and
Carmack, the court identified one subject as primary and severed the rest
of the enactment. Closer analysis is necessary. The single subject rule
assumes that "unrelated subjects were combined into one bill in order to
convert several minorities into a majority" and "declares that this perver-
sion of majority rule will not be tolerated:'4r As a result,
[t]he entire act is suspect and so it must all fall. If this is the ra-
tionale for the constitutional rule .... then it is manifestly un-
sound to employ severability to save the provisions dealing with
one of the subjects. The necessary assumption that this will
carry out the legislative purpose, assented to by a majority of
the legislators, cannot be made. s'
The question of legislative intent boils down to which provisions, if any,
served as the inducement for passage of the act.48l When logrolling is at
work, each provision theoretically serves as the inducement for some-
one's vote. Logrolling taints the entire act. In such cases, the court can
hardly be justified in choosing from the act the subject which, if submit-
ted alone, the legislature would have enacted.2 The only exception, ac-
cording to one commentator, is for bills clearly containing "riders'"
which are relatively minor, unrelated provisions inserted into much larger
bills comprehensively treating other subjects." There, the bulk of the bill
clearly would have passed; the rider was attached to it so as to secure
passage which it could not obtain on its own.' This exception is limited,
and hard to detect in the absence of published legislative history.3 Un-
less it is possible to determine with certainty that a portion of the act was
primary and would have been passed without the inducement provided by
other provisions attached to it, the court should invalidate the entire en-
actment.
On this ground, it is hard to say whether severance was proper in
Hammerschmidt and Carmnack. Hannerschmidt looks like a case of two
distinct subjects being combined in one bill for tactical reasons only. But
there is no evidence that the legislature would not have passed the elec-
S.W.2d 864, 879 (Mo. 1962) (Storckman, J., dissenting) (noting that a severability statute
cannot prevail over a constitutional mandate, and suggesting that a single subject violation
taints the whole act).
4 Ruud, supra note 7, at 399.
40 Id. (citations omitted).
41' Id.; see also 2 SINGER, supra note 9, § 44.06, at 516-17 (discussing inducements
for passage of legislation).
1 2 Ruud, supra note 7, at 400.
4L at 399-400.
4m Id. at 400 (stating that riders most often are attached to general appropriations acts,
which are assured of passage).
Id. (noting tha t it is "troublesome" to determine when the rider situation exists).
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tions provisions alone, and those provisions are complete. Carmack ap-
pears to involve a rider. The rest of the bill is complete and it is doubtful
that the insertion of the unrelated provision was essential to the bill's
passage. In these cases, severance properly balances concerns about log-
rolling against the mandate to preserve legislation to the extent possible.
This analysis suggests that severance would also have been proper in
the Illinois case, People v. Cervantes.86 In a bill comprehensively ad-
dressing the subject of neighborhood safety, two provisions were found
to treat separate subjects.4 The invalid provisions relating to welfare
vendor fraud and juvenile detention facility licensing could have been
severed without rendering the Safe Neighborhoods Law incomplete or
unworkable. There is no evidence that the invalid provisions were neces-
sary to ensure the bill's passage. The Illinois Supreme Court should have
considered severance in this case. 488 By failing to do so, it invalidated the
entire law nearly five years after its passage. By this time, changes in the
make-up of the legislature and in the political agenda of the day made it
impossible to reenact the valid portions of the law. 489 The Illinois Su-
preme Court in Cervantes tread too heavily on the legislature's preroga-
tive.
3. Clear Title
As for clear title violations, the Missouri Supreme Court has prop-
erly connected the remedy with the particular manner in which the bill's
title violated the rule. St. Louis Health Care Network involved a title so
broad as to be meaningless. 490 The court held the whole bill unconstitu-
tional; there was no discussion of severance.4 9' Though the court did not
say so explicitly, invalidation is the only proper remedy for this type of
title violation. The purpose of the clear title rule is to provide notice of
the bill's contents, and if the title is so amorphous as to provide no notice
whatsoever, the whole act must be invalidated. 491
- 723 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. 1999).
48 Id. at 272.
4" The Governor of Illinois filed an amicus brief requesting that the court consider
severing the invalid provisions and allowing the remainder of the Safe Neighborhoods Law
to stand. Brief of Amicus Curiae Governor George H. Ryan in Support of the Petition for
Rehearing Filed by Plaintiff-Appellant People of the State of Illinois at 7 (filed Jan. 24,
2000). The court denied the motion for rehearing. 723 N.E. 2d 265 (Ill. 1999).
48 Chambers, supra note 47.49°See St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145, 147-49 (Mo. 1998)
(en banc).
491 See id. The court's holding may simply respond to the procedural posture of the
case, which sought a declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality. Id. at 146.4
9See 1A SINGER, supra note 9, § 18.08, at 54; cf Ruud, supra note 7, at 402 (assert-
ing that if the title gives adequate notice, the act should be held valid).
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Solid Waste Management, on the other hand, involved an under-
inclusive title.4 93 The court implicitly recognized that the bill's title gave
adequate notice as to most of its provisions. Accordingly, the court lim-
ited the statute to those applications within the title.4 The rationale be-
hind the clear title rule is, by definition, satisfied as to some portion of
the bill when the title is under-inclusive. The question is whether the
portion adequately expressed in the title meets the independence and
completeness requirements for severance. If so, severance of the remain-
der is proper.
As noted earlier, however, the invalid portion of the bill in Solid
Waste Management was not in fact capable of severance. 95 Both the valid
and the invalid matters were subsumed within the textual phrase "pursu-
ant to this chapter" which delineated the application of the provision.4 7
Thus, the court restricted the statute to apply only to matters expressed in
the title. Accomplishing severance by restricting the provision's applica-
tion to a subset of what its terms cover is a bad idea because then the text
of the statute no longer means what it says. This action "amount[s] to
judicial amendment" of the statute,497 a practice Associated Industries
specifically disavowed.43 The proper remedy when the void provisions
are incapable of severance is to invalidate the statute altogether.
In sum, the rationales underlying the three distinct constitutional
limitations suggest that severance is the proper remedy for certain single
subject and clear title violations. In single subject cases, severance is
proper when logrolling was not involved and when severance can be ac-
complished without rewriting the statute. As long as logrolling was not at
work, severance affords appropriate deference to the legislature without
eviscerating the constitutional prohibition. Clear title violations involving
under-inclusive titles also permit severance if the statute is in fact capa-
ble of severance. Under-inclusive titles give notice as to some, but not
all, of the bill's contents. In these cases, the purpose of the rule is served
as to the portion of the bill expressed in the title. Overbroad titles, how-
ever, taint the entire bill and render the whole enactment void. Original
purpose violations have the same effect. In these cases, severance is im-
proper.
49 See Solid Waste Mgmt., 964 S.W.2d at 821.
494 Id. at 822.
495 See supra notes 447-463 and accompanying text. A complete discussion of sever-
ance by application is beyond the scope of this Article.
496 Solid Waste Mgmt., 964 S.W.2d at 822.
497 2 SINGER, supra note 9, § 44.15, at 542.
498See Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Dir. of Revenue, 918 S.WV.2d 780, 785 (Mo. 1996).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Constitutional restrictions on legislative procedure are intended to
prevent ill-considered, surreptitious, or corrupt legislation. Though liti-
gants employ these restrictions to seek invalidation of legislation for a
variety of reasons, the facts of recent cases suggest that legislatures occa-
sionally resort to procedures that the original purpose, single subject, and
clear title rules were designed to eliminate.4 99 Courts must walk a fine
line between enforcing these constitutional requirements and unduly in-
terfering with the legislative process.
Recent Missouri cases illustrate several permutations of each type of
procedural violation, and also highlight difficulties in the analysis of
these claims. First of all, courts, commentators, and litigants sometimes
fail to distinguish the three procedural claims and to address their sepa-
rate underlying rationales. As a result, the test for compliance with each
of the procedural requirements is confusing. In a few cases, rhetorical
imprecision, analytical weakness, or an overly deferential posture led to
the wrong result.
State constitutions place safeguards on the legislative process in the
form of original purpose, single subject, and clear title restrictions, and
courts should not ignore them. As the Missouri Supreme Court stated in
State v. Miller, "where a law is clearly and palpably in opposition to [the
constitutional limitation], there is no other alternative but to pronounce it
invalid."1500 As long as the people of the states continue to impose consti-
tutional restrictions on legislative procedure, state courts will be called
upon to decide cases challenging legislation on these grounds. If Mis-
souri's experience is any guide, the failure to apply rigorous, consistent
standards for decision of such cases will only increase the flow.
499 See Williams, supra note 1, at 800 (discussing Pennsylvania's legislature).
'0 45 Mo. 495, 498 (Mo. 1870) (discussing single subject violations).
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Art. V, § 45
Art. 11, § 13
Art. IV, Pt. 2, § 13
Art. 4, § 9
Art. 5, § 21
Art. H, § 16
Art. 3, § 6
Art. 3, § 5
Art. III,§ 14
Art. m, § 16
Art. 4, § 8(d)
Art. 4, § 19
Art. I, § 29
Art. I, § 16
§51
Art. 3, § 15(A)s
Art. III, § 29
Art. IV, § 247
Art. IV, § 17
Art. III, § 23
Art. V, § 11(3)
Art. m, § 14
Art.IV, § 17
Art. III, § 29
Art. IV, § 24
Art. IV, § 17
Art. III, § 238
Art. IV, § 71
Art. V, § 11(3)
Art. III, § 14
Art. IV, § 17
Original
Purpose
Art. IV, § 61
Art. 5, §21
Art. 5, § 17
Clear
Title
Art. IV, § 45
Art. H, § 13
Art. IV, Pt. 2, § 13'
Art. 4, § 9
Art. 5, § 212
Art. II, § 16
Art. 3, § 6
Art. 3, § 5
Art. I, § 14
Art. I, § 163
Art. III, § 29
Art. II, § 16
§51
Art. 3, § 15(A)
Art. III, § 21
Art. IV, § 60
Art. V, § 11(1)
I Provides that act containing objects not expressed in title is void only as to the por-
tion not expressed.
2Provides that act containing objects not expressed in title is void only as to the por-
tion not expressed.
3 Provides that act containing objects not expressed in title is void only as to the por-
tion not expressed.
4 Illinois formerly had a clear title requirement but dropped it in the constitutional re-
vision of 1970. See Chambers, supra note 14.
5 Refers to single "object."
6 Prohibits amendment of bill "to make a change not germane to the bill as intro-
duced'"
7 Refers to "one object."
gFormerly provided that where subject is not expressed in title, act is void only as to
portions not expressed. Mo. CONST. of 1865, Art. IV, §32.
Art. 3, § 15(C)6
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Art. 4, § 79
Art. IV, § 16
Art. 3, § 15
Art. IV, § 13
Art. II, § 15(D)
Art. V, § 57
Art. IV, § 23
Art. III, § 3
Art. III, § 17
Art. III, § 21
Art. II, § 17
Art. III, § 35(a)
Art. VI, § 22
Art. IV, § 1214
Art. 2, § 19
Art. VI, § 30's
Art. 4, § 18
Art. 3, § 24
Art. 4, § 7, 4
Art. IV, § 1610
Art. 3, § 15
Art. IV, § 13
Art. II, § 15(D)
Art. V, § 5712
Art. IV, § 20
Art. III, § 3
Art. III, § 17
Art. III, § 21
Art. II, § 17
Art. III, § 35(b)' 3
Art. VI, § 22
Art. IV, § 12
Art. 2, § 19
Art. VI, § 30
Art. 4, § 18
Art. 3, § 24' 7
9 Refers to "one object:'
10 Provides that act containing objects not expressed in title is void only as to the por-
tion not expressed.
,1 Applies only to "private or local bills.'
12 Provides that act containing objects not expressed in title is void only as to the por-
tion not expressed.
13 Provides that the "legislature is solely responsible for determining compliance" with
the clear title rule.
14 Refers to "one object.'
'- Refers to "one object."
16 Applies only to "private or local" bills.
17 Provides that act containing objects not expressed in title is void only as to the por-
tion not expressed.
Art. III, § 1
Art. III, § 30
Art. 3, § 20
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APPENDIX II
1. Original Purpose Cases Finding Violation
Advisory Opinion No. 331, 582 So. 2d 1115 (Ala. 1991)"8
Barclay v. Melton, 5 S.W.3d 457 (Ark. 1999)
2. Original Purpose Cases Finding No Violation
C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. 2000) (en
banc)
St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998)
(en banc)"9
Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir., Dep't of Natural Res., 964
S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1998) (en banc)l
Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)
Akin v. Dir., Dept. of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1996) (en
bane)
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990)
Mollman v. State, 800 P.2d 466 (Wyo. 1990)
Heggen v. State, 800 P.2d 475 (Wyo. 1990)
Cambio v. State, 800 P.2d 482 (Wyo. 1990)
3. Single Subject Cases Finding Violation
Exparte Springer, 619 So. 2d 1267 (Ala. 1992)
State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999)
Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1991)
People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. 1999)
People v. Wooters, 722 N.E.2d 1102 (Ill. 1999)
People v. Reedy, 708 N.E.2d 1114 (Ill. 1999)
Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (IlM. 1997)
State v. Taylor, 557 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1996)
Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1994)
Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d 1225 (Md. 2000)
Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111 (Md. 1990)
Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293
(Minn. 2000)
Mo. Health Care Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 953 S.W.2d 617 (Mo.
1997) (en banc)
18 Concerns an appropriations bill, but relevant for original purpose claim.
19 Claim raised but not decided.
20 Claim raised but not decided.
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Carmack v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Agric., 945 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. 1997)
(en banc)
Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1994) (en
banc)
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d
1062 (Ohio 1999)
State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin County Bd. for Elections, 580 N.E.2d
767 (Ohio 1991)
Campbell v. White, 856 P.2d 255 (Okla. 1993)
Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694 (Okla. 1991)
McIntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846 (Or. 1996)
Tenn. Mun. League v. Thompson, 958 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1997)
Wash. State Legislature v. State, 985 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1999)
Kincaid v. Mangum, 432 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1993)
4. Single Subject Cases Finding No Violation
Town of Brilliant v. City of Winfield, 752 So. 2d 1192 (Ala. 1999)
Exparte Coker, 575 So. 2d 43 (Ala. 1990)
Lutz v. Foran, 427 S.E.2d 248 (Ga. 1993)
Kinsela v. State, 790 P.2d 1388 (Id. 1990)
Premier Prop. Mgmt. v. Chavez, 728 N.E.2d 476 (Ill. 2000)
Arangold v. Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191 (Ill. 1999)21
People v. Dunigan, 650 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. 1995)
Geja's Caf6 v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212 (111.
1992)
Bayh v. Ind. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 674 N.E.2d 176
(Ind. 1996)
Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Court, 586 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa
1998)
Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 570 N.W.2d 451 (Iowa
1997)
State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472 (Iowa 1990)
State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 955
P.2d 1136 (Kan. 1998)
Kan. Pub. Empls. Ret. Sys. V. Reimer & Kroger Assocs., Inc., 941
P.2d 1321 (Kan. 1997)
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994)
Harding v. K.C. Wall Products, Inc., 831 P.2d 958 (Kan. 1992)
Doherty v. Caleasien Parish Sch. Bd., 634 So. 2d 1172 (La. 1994)
Md. Classified Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. State, 694 A.2d 937 (Md.
21 Concerns a "budget implementation bill," which apparently differs from an appro-
priations bill. 718 N.E.2d at 195 (describing "actual state budget" adopted on same day as
"budget implementation bill").
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1997)
Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v. County of Hennepin, 478
N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 1991)
C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. 2000) (en
banc)
Corvera Abatement Techs. v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 973 S.W.
2d 851 (Mo. 1998) (en banc)
St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998)
(en banc)'
Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir., Dept. of Natural Res., 964
S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1998) (en banc)3
Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)
Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)
Akin v. Dir., Dept. of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1996) (en
bane)
Jaksha v. State, 486 N.W.2d 858 (Neb. 1992)
Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio 1997)
State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio
1994)
Keyserling v. Beasley, 470 S.E.2d 100 (S.C. 1996)
Westvaco Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 467 S.E.2d 739 (S.C.
1995)
Acets. Mgmt., Inc. v. Williams, 484 N.W.2d 297 (S.D. 1992)
State v. Broadaway, 942 P.2d 363 (Wash. 1997)
In re Boot, 925 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1996)
State v. Thorne, 921 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1996)
Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 901 P.2d 1028 (Wash.
1995)
Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep't, 466 S.E.2d 424 (NV. Va.
1995)
State ex rel. Marockie v. Wagoner, 446 S.E.2d 680 (V. Va. 1994)
City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 491 N.W.2d
484 (Wis. 1992)
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Vyo. 1990)
Mollman v. State, 800 P.2d 466 (,Vyo. 1990)
Heggen v. State, 800 P.2d 475 (,Vyo. 1990)
Cambio v. State, 800 P.2d 482 (Wyo. 1990)
5. Clear Title Cases Finding Violation
State v. Taylor, 557 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1996)
St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998)
2 Claim raised but not decided.
2 Claim raised but not decided.
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(en banc)
Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n. v. Dir., Dept. of Natural Res., 964
S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1998) (en banc)
Mclntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846 (Or. 1996)
Tenn. Mun. League v. Thompson, 958 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1997)
Patrice v. Murphy, 966 P.2d 1271 (Wash. 1998)
6. Clear Title Cases Finding No Violation
McGlothren v. E. Shore Family Practice, 742 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 1999)
Louvier v. Mobile County Bd. of Educ., 670 So. 2d 873 (Ala. 1995)
Hussey v. Chatham County, 494 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. 1998)
Lutz v. Foran, 427 S.E.2d 248 (Ga. 1993)
Kinsela v. State, 790 P.2d 1388 (Idaho 1990)
Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 570 N.W.2d 451 (Iowa
1997)
Yeoman v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1998)
Commonwealth Revenue Cabinet v. Smith, 875 S.W.2d 873 (Ky.
1994)
La. Seafood Mgm't Council v. La. Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n,
715 So. 2d 387 (La. 1998)
C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. 2000) (en
banc)
Corvera Abatement Techs. v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 973 S.W.2d
851 (Mo. 1998) (en banc)
Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)
Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)
Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1994) (en
banc) 4
Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288 (N.M. 1995)
Thompson v. McKinley County, 816 P.2d 494 (N.M. 1991)
Westvaco Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 467 S.E.2d 739 (S.C.
1995)
Accounts Mgmt., Inc. v. Williams, 484 N.W.2d 297 (S.D. 1992)
Brower v. State, 969 P.2d 42 (Wash. 1998)
State v. Broadaway, 942 P.2d 363 (Wash. 1997)
In re Boot, 925 P. 2d 964 (Wash. 1996)
Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. State 901 P.2d 1028 (Wash.
1995)
McCoy v. VanKirk, 500 S.E.2d 534 (W. Va. 1997)
State ex rel. Lambert v. County Comm'n of Boone County, 452
S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1994)
State ex rel. Marokie v. Wagoner, 446 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1994)
24 Claim raised but not decided.
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